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ABSTRACT
This project examines the ongoing debate over internet content discrimination,
more commonly referred to as network neutrality. It offers a new approach to
examining this issue by combining a critical, political economy approach with Lawrence
Lessig’s four modalities of regulation: policy, architecture, markets, and norms. It
presents a critical, comparative case study analysis of how architecture, markets and
norms have shaped United States policy along with comparative examples from select
international case studies facing similar regulatory issues. Its findings suggest that
while each of the four modalities plays a significant role in the regulation and
persistence of network neutrality, there is a need for more clear, robust policy measures
to address content discrimination online. Based on these analyses, the author offers
policy recommendations for future network neutrality regulation.
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1

INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ended the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) latest attempt to enforce Network
Neutrality (NN), a principle that urged network providers to treat all digital content equally.1
The FCC’s rejected policy, the 2010 Open Internet Order, mandated providers disclose their
network management practices and prohibited blocking or discriminating against lawful
content on their networks.2
The court’s ruling in favor of communications giant Verizon was based primarily on the
FCC’s previous classification of internet services as different from and therefore not held to the
same standards as telecommunication services (e.g. telephone) and therefore not held to the
same standards.3 Because of historical threats from monopolistic abuse at the hands of
providers like AT&T, many previous communication services were protected as common
carriers for nearly a century.4 The principle of common carriage (with a history stretching as far
back as ancient Rome) refers to the obligation of transportation information networks serving a
vital connecting role in society to treat content equally.5 But despite travelling on the same or
similar infrastructure as telephone, network owners have argued information services like the
internet be considered different, which, in practice means less oversight and more opportunities
for abuse. As internet protocol services, content, and networks increasingly play a central role in
modern society the equal transportation of information across these networks must be insured,
either by legal rulemaking or through other means of regulation.

1	
  Wyatt,	
  “Rebuffing	
  F.C.C.	
  in	
  ‘Net	
  Neutrality’	
  Case,	
  Court	
  Allows	
  Streaming	
  Deals.”	
  
2	
  Federal	
  Communications	
  Commission,	
  In	
  the	
  Matter	
  of	
  Preserving	
  the	
  Open	
  Internet	
  

Broadband	
  Industry	
  Practices.	
  
3	
  “Sender-Side Transmission Rules for the Internet.”	
  
4	
  Wu,	
  The	
  Master	
  Switch:	
  The	
  Rise	
  and	
  Fall	
  of	
  Information	
  Empires.	
  
5	
  Ibid.;	
  Marsden,	
  Net	
  Neutrality.	
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In the wake of the 2014 ruling, NN supporters have been eager to cast blame for the
issue’s lack of support. Neutrality advocates have criticized the FCC’s piecemeal approach, the
consolidation of the telecommunications and media industries, and a lack of political attention
paid to internet issues in general.6 Meanwhile, the FCC led by chairman Tom Wheeler has
worked to outline a revised set of policies to guide the FCC’s enforcing of an “open internet.”
With the FCC’s previous policy invalidated and the status of network neutrality in limbo, the
need for examining the issue and potential policy directions is greater than ever.
In this pursuit, I will argue the need for network neutrality, describe its major
participants and acknowledge the major works examining the topic so far. This chapter includes
offers a theoretical lens for examining now network neutrality is regulated as well as the
purpose and methodological design for this project in general. Finally, it includes a guide to the
subsequent chapters of this thesis.

1.1

The need for neutrality
While feckless FCC policies and the powerful financial lobbying and political influence

of network owners have drawn much of the blame for the weakening of network neutrality in
the U.S., the historical, commercial, technological, and social factors surrounding the issue have
arguably played a larger role in the current state of network discrimination both in the U.S. and
around the world.
Access to communication and information networks offers individuals powerful
opportunities to contribute and participate in public life. The concept of network neutrality is
designed to protect these opportunities.7 The internet offers shortcuts to people and ideas from
around the world while also bridging previously immense distances between those in power
6	
  Patel,	
  “The	
  Wrong	
  Words”;	
  Herrman,	
  “Welcome	
  To	
  The	
  Net	
  Neutrality	
  Nightmare	
  

Scenario.”	
  
7	
  Zittrain,	
  Net	
  Neutrality	
  as	
  Diplomacy,	
  23;	
  Nunziato,	
  Virtual	
  Freedom;	
  Benkler,	
  The	
  Wealth	
  
of	
  Networks.	
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and the rest of the public.8 The public’s ability to share information and data offers
opportunities to cultivate public discourse and share information, however network operators
have continued to seek control over whom and what can be transmitted across the internet.
Recently, a tenuous balance of policies and other mechanisms has existed to preserve access and
equal treatment online. The 2014 Verizon ruling is just one demonstration of the frailty of
network neutrality policies in the U.S. As these regulatory means are weakened, there is a need
for more robust and effective policies to protect neutrality.
In this project, I examine how the markets, laws and architecture of the internet have
failed to maintain a reasonable level of network neutrality in the U.S. By highlighting these
failures in contrast to other approaches to net neutrality from around the world, I argue for
more robust policy principles to address fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory information
carriage across the web moving forward.

1.1.1

What is Network Neutrality specifically?
Network Neutrality’s broad significance and complex nature has attracted scholarly

attention from a wide range of fields including: communication, media, law, economics and
computer science. Law professors Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig introduced the concept of
9

non-discrimination for digital computing networks in 2000. They argued, the “end to end”
(e2e) design of the internet, in which information moves between users and without
interference from network providers was vital to innovation.

10

The term “Network Neutrality,” first coined by legal scholar Tim Wu in 2003, builds on
this foundation and the most basic sense describes the principle of preventing of digital content
and service discrimination by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other network owners
8	
  Kelty,	
  “From	
  Participation	
  to	
  Power.”	
  
9	
  Lemley	
  and	
  Lessig,	
  “The	
  End	
  of	
  End-‐to-‐End.”	
  
10	
  Ibid.,	
  5–7.	
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across mass digital networks – namely, what is popularly considered the internet.

11

Legal

scholar Christopher Marsden’s 2010 Net Neutrality: Towards a Co-Regulatory Solution intervenes
in the debate by offering an approach to neutrality that reconciles the industrial and political
differences over the issue of neutrality.12 Other significant legal scholarly contributions include
those by Barbara Van Schewick, Eli Noam, Jonathan Zittrain, and others who have argued for
NN based on its economic feasibility, the structural/industrial conditions which have led to its
emergence and neutrality’s implications for speech and information diplomacy respectively.13
Some scholars, including Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten, Jay Choi and Byung-Cheol Kim and
Nicholas Economides and Joacim Tåg, focus on economic analyses offering descriptive and
hypothetical modeling of the implications of neutrality.14 Another strand of research focuses on
the technical and infrastructural dynamics of neutrality, including: examinations of the
technical means of data management by Milton Mueller, the technical feasibility of neutrality by
Jon Crowcroft, and an in-depth investigation of the underlying protocols which make internet
traffic possible by Fenwick McKelvey among others.15
There have been some investigations analyzing and comparing intentional approaches
to the issue, such as those by Wallsten and Stephanie Hausladen, comparing the status of
neutrality in a handful of example countries.16 Marsden as well as Pietro Crocioni and Martin

11	
  Wu,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality,	
  Broadband	
  Discrimination,”	
  20.	
  
12	
  Marsden,	
  Net	
  Neutrality.	
  

13	
  Van	
  Schewick,	
  Towards	
  an	
  Economic	
  Framework	
  for	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Regulation;	
  Eli	
  M.	
  

Noam,	
  “Regulation	
  3.0	
  for	
  Telecom	
  3.0”;	
  Noam,	
  “Beyond	
  Net	
  Neutrality”;	
  Zittrain,	
  Net	
  
Neutrality	
  as	
  Diplomacy;	
  Zittrain,	
  “What	
  Matters	
  in	
  Net	
  Neutrality.”	
  
14	
  Hahn	
  and	
  Wallsten,	
  “The	
  Economics	
  of	
  Net	
  Neutrality”;	
  Choi	
  and	
  Kim,	
  “Net	
  Neutrality	
  and	
  
Investment	
  Incentives”;	
  Economides	
  and	
  Tåg,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality	
  on	
  the	
  Internet.”	
  
15	
  Mueller	
  and	
  Asghari,	
  “Deep	
  Packet	
  Inspection	
  and	
  Bandwidth	
  Management”;	
  Crowcroft,	
  
“Net	
  Neutrality”;	
  Pouwelse	
  et	
  al.,	
  “Pirates	
  and	
  Samaritans”;	
  Moustafa	
  and	
  Zeadally,	
  Media	
  
Networks	
  Architectures,	
  Applications,	
  and	
  Standards;	
  McKelvey,	
  “Ends	
  and	
  Ways.”	
  
16	
  Wallsten	
  and	
  Hausladen,	
  “Net	
  Neutrality,	
  Unbundling,	
  and	
  Their	
  Effects	
  on	
  International	
  
Investment	
  in	
  Next-‐Generation	
  Networks.”	
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Cave have highlighted some of the neutrality conditions in the European Union, while Jeffrey
Blevins and Leslie Shade compared the US neutrality conditions to those in Canada.17 John
Stevenson and Andrew Clement performed a comparative policy analysis between Japan, the
European Union, the US, and Canada.18
While the majority of scholars appear either neutral or in favor of network neutrality,
the literature includes some scholarly detractors. Most notably, this group includes legal scholar
Christopher Yoo who has argued against the issue on the basis of its technical infeasibility,
industrial pressure and unnecessary intervention.19 Adam Thierer has argued the neutrality
debate may be an example of regulatory overreach, which threatens the innovation of
networks.20 Other arguments against network neutrality policies or interventions include a
comparison to broadcast licenses by Richard Epstein and an overview of regulatory trends in
comparison to neutrality by Weisman and Robinson.21 Some, like Robert Zelnick and Eva
Zelnick have suggested temporary network neutrality policies may endanger the long-term
feasibility of the internet itself.22

17	
  Cave	
  and	
  Crocioni,	
  “Does	
  Europe	
  Need	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Rules?”;	
  Crocioni,	
  “Net	
  

Neutrality	
  in	
  Europe”;	
  Blevins	
  and	
  Shade,	
  “Editorial.”	
  
18	
  Stevenson	
  and	
  Clement,	
  “Regulatory	
  Lessons	
  for	
  Internet	
  Traffic	
  Management	
  from	
  
Japan,	
  the	
  European	
  Union,	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States.”	
  
19	
  Yoo,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality	
  after	
  Comcast:	
  Toward	
  a	
  Case-‐by-‐Case	
  Approach	
  to	
  Reasonable	
  
Network	
  Management”;	
  Yoo,	
  “Is	
  There	
  a	
  Role	
  for	
  Common	
  Carriage	
  in	
  an	
  Internet-‐Based	
  
World?”;	
  Wu	
  and	
  Yoo,	
  “Keeping	
  the	
  Internet	
  Neutral?”;	
  Yoo,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality	
  after	
  
Comcast:	
  Toward	
  a	
  Case-‐by-‐Case	
  Approach	
  to	
  Reasonable	
  Network	
  Management.”	
  
20	
  Thierer,	
  “‘Net	
  Neutrality’	
  Digital	
  Discrimination	
  or	
  Regulatory	
  Gamesmanship	
  in	
  
Cyberspace?”;	
  Thierer,	
  “Are	
  Dumb	
  Pipe	
  Mandates	
  Smart	
  Public	
  Policy	
  -‐	
  Vertical	
  Integration,	
  
Net	
  Neutrality,	
  and	
  the	
  Network	
  Layers	
  Model.”	
  
21	
  Epstein,	
  “What	
  Broadcast	
  Licenses	
  Tell	
  Us	
  about	
  Net	
  Neutrality:	
  Cosmopolitan	
  
Broadcasting	
  Corporation	
  v.	
  FCC”;	
  Weisman	
  and	
  Robinson,	
  “Lessons	
  for	
  Modern	
  Regulators	
  
from	
  Hippocrates,	
  Schumpeter	
  and	
  Kahn.”	
  
22	
  Zelnick,	
  The	
  Illusion	
  of	
  Net	
  Neutrality.	
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The ongoing dispute over neutrality has drawn attention from scholars who have
analyzed the debate itself – these include studies by Kai Zhu and by Douglas Hass.23 Likewise,
there have been a handful of studies examining the terminology and rhetorical appeals used by
both academics and policymakers regarding the issue. These include projects such as a 2013
analysis of congressional records regarding the issue by Gilroy and a 2013 discourse analysis of
the term “net neutrality” by Kimball.24
While these contributions and many others offer significant contributions to the NN
debate, the issue remains unresolved and is often influenced on a number of fronts including
politically, economically and by the larger public. While all of these groups have participated in
the conversation regarding content discrimination, the size and influence of the participants
with a stake in the outcome is particularly significant.

1.1.2

Lines drawn in the neutrality debate
Major participants in the NN debate include some of the world’s largest media

conglomerates including Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon as well as technology giants like Google,
Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft. The issue has garnered political attention ranging from the
US White House to the leadership of the European Union.

25

In particular, neutrality advocates

have focused on the threat of network management as a tool for corporate or political
26

censorship. Despite the sometimes-opaque nature of the debate’s technical and legal jargon,

23	
  Zhu,	
  “Bringing	
  Neutrality	
  to	
  Network	
  Neutrality”;	
  Hass,	
  “The	
  Never-‐Was-‐Neutral	
  Net	
  and	
  

Why	
  Informed	
  End	
  Users	
  Can	
  End	
  the	
  Net	
  Neutrality	
  Debates.”	
  
24	
  Gilroy,	
  “Access	
  to	
  Broadband	
  Networks”;	
  Kimball,	
  “What	
  We	
  Talk	
  about	
  When	
  We	
  Talk	
  
about	
  Net	
  Neutrality:	
  A	
  Historical	
  Genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  Discourse	
  of	
  ‘Net	
  Neutrality.’”	
  
25	
  Marsden,	
  Net	
  Neutrality;	
  Crocioni,	
  “Net	
  Neutrality	
  in	
  Europe”;	
  Peha,	
  The	
  Benefits	
  and	
  
Risks	
  of	
  Mandating	
  Network	
  Neutrality,	
  and	
  the	
  Quest	
  for	
  a	
  Balanced	
  Policy.	
  
26	
  Brown	
  and	
  Marsden,	
  Regulating	
  Code,	
  141.	
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the NN discussion has grown to include civil society groups, technological leaders and
increasingly the larger public.

27

NN not only concerns the practical and financial impact of data and bandwidth
discrimination to users, content and service providers – but, as Christopher Kelty argues, the
rules for how content travels online shape the internet’s ethical and technical dimensions.

28
29

Advocates argue that the benefits of neutrality as a tool for promoting application innovation,
weakening monopoly power,

30

31

protecting free speech and promoting creative content, are

worth the potential cost to network providers.
While the term NN is relatively new, it follows a legacy of underlying principles
supporting fair and open access to communication networks as well as content-neutral delivery
32

of information with a history extending as far back as the 17th century. Beyond the principles
of open and equal access to the global internet, the distinctions between communication,
information, infrastructure, and entertainment continue to blur. Networked computing
increasingly dominates the spaces of information interaction, creation and exchange throughout
the world. Rapid changes in computing and global networking have rested on the growth of
fast, uninterrupted, and ubiquitous access to other users, groups and information. But the
rhetoric of a democratic and equal web should not be accepted as a given. Sophisticated
networking servers and smart networks can now read data as it moves across the web; this

27	
  American	
  Civil	
  Liberties	
  Union,	
  “What	
  Is	
  Net	
  Neutrality?”;	
  Cerf,	
  “‘Father	
  of	
  the	
  Internet’”;	
  

Berners-‐Lee,	
  “Net	
  Neutrality:	
  This	
  Is	
  Serious”;	
  Nagesh,	
  “Internet	
  Users	
  Mobilize	
  as	
  FCC	
  
Prepares	
  Net	
  Neutrality	
  Plan.”	
  
28	
  Kelty,	
  Two	
  Bits.	
  
29	
  Van	
  Schewick,	
  Towards	
  an	
  Economic	
  Framework	
  for	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Regulation.	
  
30	
  Crawford,	
  Captive	
  Audience.	
  
31	
  Lee	
  and	
  Wu,	
  “Subsidizing	
  Creativity	
  through	
  Network	
  Design.”	
  
32	
  Marsden,	
  Net	
  Neutrality.	
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increases the threat of monitoring and speed management by network owners, often without
33

the users’ knowledge.

ISPs argue that to handle the rapidly growing number of users with higher bandwidth
demands, they should have some latitude to manage the volume and types of information
34

travelling across their networks. NN opponents argue that overt neutrality intervenes in the
market negotiations between content and network providers and potentially violates the
property rights of the owners and maintainers of broadband networks.

35

They suggest

neutrality policies preventing the management of content and fee structures may discourage
network infrastructure improvements and potentially stifling innovation.

36

Due to their control over much of the internet’s physical infrastructure, network owners
are in a particularly powerful position to exploit or exacerbate bandwidth limitations and
network capacity to their advantage.

37

Wu, however, argues that the intentions of ISPs may

extend beyond network management for service improvement and toward reinforcing their
38

powerful and indispensible role in the information economy.

He notes: “…it doesn’t take a

genius to realize that if AT&T and the cable companies exercised broad discretion to speed up
the business of some firms and slow down that of others, they would gain the power of life and
death over the Internet.”

39

33	
  Brown	
  and	
  Marsden,	
  Regulating	
  Code.	
  

34	
  Yoo,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality	
  after	
  Comcast:	
  Toward	
  a	
  Case-‐by-‐Case	
  Approach	
  to	
  Reasonable	
  

Network	
  Management.”	
  
35	
  Thierer,	
  “‘Net	
  Neutrality’	
  Digital	
  Discrimination	
  or	
  Regulatory	
  Gamesmanship	
  in	
  
Cyberspace?”.	
  
36	
  Ibid.;	
  Van	
  Schewick,	
  Towards	
  an	
  Economic	
  Framework	
  for	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Regulation,	
  
331–331.	
  
37	
  Wu,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality,	
  Broadband	
  Discrimination,”	
  558.	
  
38	
  Wu,	
  The	
  Master	
  Switch:	
  The	
  Rise	
  and	
  Fall	
  of	
  Information	
  Empires,	
  551.	
  
39	
  Ibid.	
  

20

1.1.3

A pressing debate
When the term “network neutrality” was coined in 2003, the capacity for networked

data transmission and the accessibility to digitally distributed content was far different from
today.

40

Broadband connections (offering download speeds of at least 4 Mbps and upload

speeds of at least 1 Mbps) have become more prevalent as consumer access to DSL, cable and
41

fiber-optic connections have replaced dial-up connections. In 2003, 16 percent of U.S. adults
had a broadband connection at home, a number that would grow to 70 percent only 10 years
later.

42

ISPs have benefited from the increased demand for fast connections and have

maintained high profit margins – reportedly about 95 to 97 percent - compared to more
expensive services like cable television which show profits of around 60 percent.

43

In 2013,

roughly a quarter of Comcast’s $40 billion in revenue from cable connection services came from
its high-speed internet.

44

In the past 30 years, ISPs like Comcast and Verizon have grown tremendously, while
competition for broadband internet access in the US has shrunk.

45

In fact, a 2013 FCC report

indicated nearly one-third of U.S. residents have access to only one residential broadband
provider and an additional 37 percent have access to only two ISPs.

46

There has also been a

marked shift toward cable ISPs like Comcast and Time Warner Cable which offer faster use
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speeds than telephone network based services liked DSL. While commercial and residential
fiber-optic networking service providers (also known as fiber to the premises or FTTP) like
Verizon FiOS and ATT U-Verse – which offer connections many times faster than cable or DSL
broadband -- are beginning to emerge and may ultimately shift these dynamics, the majority of
US internet users rely on a small handful of networks and service providers.

48

Likewise, online Content Service Providers (CSPs) have also grown both in size and
influence. News, social network, video sharing, and entertainment websites show immense
popularity; the most popular networks and sites such as Google and Facebook sport billions of
49

users and have market valuations of billions of U.S. dollars.

For example, Google’s massive

reach extends from online advertising (it’s primary form of revenue) to search, email (Gmail),
document scanning (Google Books) and many more projects. Siva Viadyanathan argues
Google’s search prioritization and sheer scale of services is increasingly making the company
“the lens through which we view the world.”

50

That “lens” relies on fast, reliable internet

access. The growth of CSPs has coincided with a shift in the nature of online use marked by the
increased popularity of “application” or self-contained and maintained online spaces rather
than a network of individually created and maintained websites.

51

The increased popularity of online video services has led to a growth in the volume of
information travelling across networks. Video services such as YouTube, online streaming
subscription services like Netflix and the growth of peer-to-peer file-sharing services make up
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an increasingly large portion of U.S. internet traffic. Services like Netflix, which boasted over
44 million subscribers in 2014, are increasingly competing with cable television for viewers.

53

According to a 2014 report by internet traffic monitor Sadnvine, Netflix was responsible for the
overwhelming majority of downstream internet traffic in the US, with the service consuming 34
percent of the bandwidth used during peak hours.

54

Google-owned video streaming site

YouTube consumed over 20 percent of the bandwidth in Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin
55

America. In the US, the top 15 percent of users were responsible for over half of all internet
56

traffic and consumed 11-times more streaming content than the average internet subscriber.

ISPs (many of which are also cable television providers) claim the growth of these bandwidthheavy services and users requires greater latitude of controls to guarantee consistent service.
Some critics, like Crawford, argue this control may be used as an excuse to exert pressure on
video service competitors siphoning “cord cutters” from traditional cable TV service.

57

To complicate matters further, the lines between ISPs and CSPs are eroding. In part, the
NN debate is the result of the convergence of television, data, and telephone services within a
58

single network. With previously separate forms of media increasingly traveling across the
internet infrastructure, network providers are investing in online content (e.g. Comcast’s
acquisition of NBCUniversal) while some content providers have started investing in
broadband construction (e.g. Google’s fiber-to-the-home initiatives). Service agreements
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between content and networks, vertical ownership agreements, and paid access to networks
59

further complicate their interactions.

These relationships are further complicated by the introduction of customer-facing
network providers connect to high-capacity backbone network providers (such as Level 3) that
link ISPs to each other. The agreements between backbone providers have generally received
far less regulatory scrutiny than those of consumer-facing ISPs.

60

According to Lee and Wu,

these agreements between backbone providers, ISPs and the largest CSPs (often called access
fees or usage fees) are markedly different from fees charged to consumers.

61

The rapidly shifting conditions surrounding NN have made the issue both more
pressing, but also more complex. The technological, economic and political specifics of the last
10 years have changed greatly; the dramatically expanded role of digitally networked
communication has facilitated a corresponding increase in the power of network operators and
the concerns of internet users about that power.

1.2

A multi-dimensional approach
Network Neutrality has been described as “a subject that sounds mind-numbingly dull,”

but this may only be a sign of the density and scope of the subject matter.62 The concept lies at
the center of many ongoing conversations and trends of technology, politics, society and
economics. Because of this complexity, a critical, historically grounded, and systematic
examination of the ongoing NN debate is warranted to better understand the nuances and
development of the neutrality, its major institutional actors, and its place in the larger
development of the current media/information environment.
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1.2.1

Neutrality, information and power
The challenges and opportunities of NN echo those described in earlier media

scholarship by raising questions about the impact of information technology on political, social,
and economic life.63 Political economy scholars have paid particular attention to the ways
institutional structures of ownership, development, and technological shifts have significantly
affected the expansion, content and larger reception of media throughout the world.64 The
political economy approach recognizes the importance of examining and analyzing institutional
and economic power imbalances in society and their possible effects.65 Today, the growing
importance of global, digital information and communication networks has magnified these
power imbalances. Robert McChesney and Dan Schiller warn that consolidation of the most
influential media organizations only increases the potential for censorship, exploitation,
inequality and silencing.66 The political economy approach encourages critically examining
these economically powerful institutions and actors, while highlighting the social and political
implications of their actions.
Historically, media technologies and networks (as well as their controllers) have acted as
primary conduits of political, economic and cultural development and power.67 The work of
Frankfurt School scholars like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer and their concerns about
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the political and social effects of media ownership has driven critical media scholarship. 68
Rapid growth and centralization of media ownership and distribution in the last half of the 20th
century has inspired political economists and other communication scholars to examine the
powerful potential and effects of changing media ecologies not only in the U.S. but throughout
the world. Likewise, studies examining media industries extends the legacy of early media
scholars while combining the political economy and cultural studies legacies of communication
research to better understand the nexus of politics, economics, media, and information.69
The role of media institutions, powerful communication actors and media policy
extends beyond ownership to the nature of information and the role of it in social and political
life. As Armand Mattelart notes: information’s role in society has changed greatly since the
Enlightenment and its collection, ownership and distribution have played a role in the
acceleration of military expansion, imperialism and global capitalism.70 The expansion of digital
information across the internet is only the most recent example of this trend.
Dan Schiller argues information has increasingly become a commodity that is packaged,
sold and distributed as a major aspect of the current U.S. economy.71 His work traces the legacy
of intellectual property laws, communication systems and policies in protecting the economic
potential of information and privileging the powerful corporations and institutions best
positioned in the global information and media environment.72 With its origins as a
decentralized communication network for the U.S. military, the global internet increasingly
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drives economic and political power and because of that, the corporations and organizations
that control how information moves across the internet wield immense influence.73
Digitization and global connection has made communication networks (and the
transportation of information across them) increasingly significant to everyday life and
commerce. As media ownership continues to concentrate through both vertical and horizontal
integration and the arbiters of content distribution and creation increasingly merge to become a
handful of competitors – the means and motivation to exert influence on the traffic of
information increases. This, combined with laissez-faire regulation and rapid technological
change, means that it is vital for critical media scholars to focus on issues like infrastructure,
industrial influence and ownership.

1.2.2

Four modalities of regulation
In addition to a critical, political economic perspective which scrutinizes the historical

and relational shifts of the involved media institutions, this examination of the NN debate
warrants a theoretical framework that systematically breaks the primary terms and issues of the
debate into significant, but manageable categories while recognizing the interconnection of each
category to each other and the issue as a whole.
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Figure 1.0.1 Lessig's four modalities.

Lessig’s four modalities, a theoretical design first described in his essay “The New
Chicago School,” offers a pattern for understanding the multiple dimensions which regulate
behavior.74 He describes four separate, but cooperating concepts (see Figure 1.) – laws, markets,
architecture, and norms – which together describe and dictate the tools society has for
regulating behavior. These four modalities shape the social understanding of issues and their
role in society.75 Whereas policy studies may be constrained to the law and its effects, a study of
multiple modalities offers a more encompassing perspective that includes factors like
commerce, structure and culture.
Lessig emphasizes that each modality works with and against the others to form a wider
regulatory environment not limited to any particular aspect.76 The regulations and their
secondary effects on each other shape behavior for both users and the tools themselves. In the
context of online activities, Lessig offers a few examples to illustrate each of the modalities.77
For example:
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Laws: Many if not all states have laws and policies regarding obscenity, copyright, state
secrets and speech that continue online different levels of enforceability online. 78
Norms: Community-accepted social conventions about behavior on message boards or
comments sections of websites often have standards and customs of behavior.
Markets: Price structures, advertising agreement, paid access, ownership and
sponsorship, may affect what people see and do online or their ability to contribute to ongoing
events or conversations.
Architecture: The TCP/IP and other protocols of web have been and continue to be
designed to facilitate particular forms of interaction and activities. The programmed
architecture of the web enables (or prohibits) various degrees of security, anonymity,
accountability, tractability and information capacity.79 Because online architecture is
particularly subject to the whims of its creators and owners, some aspects of the web’s
architecture may afford greater information spread;80 other parts have been designed to create
choke points which allowing sophisticated information filtering and censorship.81
In particular, architectural choices, called “codes” by Lessig, are often the result of
individual decisions that establish the parameters of online activities (which may or may not
align with the larger public’s will.)82 He suggests, “the most effective way to regulate behavior
in cyberspace will be through the regulation of code - direct regulation either of the code of
cyberspace itself, or of the institutions (code writers) that produce that code.”83 However, this
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may be easier said than done. Individual instances may be easy for laws to regulate, but larger,
shifting social trends are much more difficult.84
Rather than serving as definitive categories, Lessig’s modalities are not meant to be
exhaustive, but rather a starting point for examining the different vectors that shape human
behavior. Recently, other scholars have employed similar arrays of categorizations or modalities
to understand media and technologies are created, consumed or understood. For example, Price
emphasizes the balancing relationships between sovereignty, technology, and cultural norms in
his examination of global media power.85 Gillespie examined how platforms interact with
cultural, regulatory and market demands in his examination of the video site YouTube.86 Van
Dijck explored the interplay between ownership, technology, governance, usage, content and
business models in a variety of online platforms while examining the interplay between
ownership, technology, governance, usage, content, and business models.87 Yang’s The Power of
the Internet employs a slightly different modality-based scheme for examining online activism in
China.88 While these adaptations sometime differ from Lessig’s specific modalities in
terminology and focus, they share an emphasis on examining these media issues across
multiple, interacting dimensions.
Neutrality’s ramifications extend beyond policy and to an underlying understanding of
how users and stakeholders agree the functionality and operation of network protocols may
operate and how information may be distributed. The expansive and evolving nature of the NN
issue requires a systematic categorization of the elements operating within the debate. As Lessig
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notes, “to understand how a regulation might succeed, we must view these four modalities as
acting on the same field, and understand how they interact.”89

1.3

Unpacking neutrality regulation
Network neutrality’s implementation and enforcement in the United States been marked

by a handful of piecemeal policies and regulations that have been repeatedly struck-down in
court. Because of this, the handful of policy orders issued by the FCC over the last two decades
has largely relied on market, architectural and normative conditions of telecommunications and
internet technology providers to enforce non-discriminatory information movement. Lessig’s
four modalities (laws, norms, markets, and architecture) offer a way to outline a fuller
landscape of regulation, and in the case of NN this is particularly true.90
Unlike previous information communication technologies (like telephones and
railways), the decentralized nature and protocols of the internet combined with its underlying
infrastructure has served as both a justification for and against neutrality policies. Likewise, the
normative understanding of the internet and its relationship to openness and independence
beyond the physical and technological has fueled and sometimes divided the popular
understanding of the global networks’ capabilities and the role of users within it. Powerful
market actors and gatekeepers have an immense influence on users and content.91 The
following project unpacks these issues by offering comparative study that unpacks multiple
aspects of the neutrality debate both in the US and abroad.
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1.3.1

Knowledge through comparison
As Castells notes, “the United States represents the exception in the history of

communication regulation from a global perspective.”92 Net neutrality is no exception. Unique
historical, political, demographic and economic considerations have led to a wide range of
approaches and perspectives regarding NN.93 For example, some highly developed and
commercially oriented countries share similar elements to the US and it’s approach to network
structure, ownership and policies.94 These similarities and differences have been further
affected by the introduction and growth of international organizations such as the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and global/regional trade agreements like the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO.)95 Different
perspectives from throughout the world offer insights into potential solutions, principles and
challenges in maintaining, establishing or constructing practical and effective nondiscrimination policies.

1.3.2

Research questions
This is a project of diagnosis, comparison and analysis. In it, I examine the failure of

architecture, norms, and markets to maintain network neutrality and prevent information
discrimination across the Internet in the US. To do this, I examine the concepts and history of
these elements regarding networked communication as well as compare and contrasting their
failures (and successes) in other countries throughout the world.
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With this project I seek to answer the following research questions:
RQ1: How have laws, norms, architecture, and markets each contributed to the current NN
regulatory framework in the US?
RQ2: How can the policy responses to market, architecture, and normative regulation of NN
in select international case studies inform future network neutrality policy in the US?

1.3.3

Method
Through a series of comparative case studies highlighting both US and non-US

approaches to the issue, this project examines the failure of norms, markets, and architecture to
maintain effective NN policy. As Ran Wei notes, case studies offer a useful tool for researching
new technologies, particularly because the approach allows researchers to examine specific
technologies or element of those technologies that are rapidly changing.96 Case studies also
provide a significant way to examine and unpack complex situations, behaviors or processes.97
In particular, John Odell notes that comparative case studies provide a powerful methodology
for examining international political economy issues.98
While each of the above modalities has drawn the attention of many different groups,
participants and institutions have played a part in the perception, policymaking and regulation
of this issue. This process includes tracing and analyzing significant elements of each modality
within the US context and in the context of each chapter’s selected case studies outlined below.
These kinds of disciplined, interpretative case studies, particularly when conducted using
comparative examples, provide deeper context and more nuanced examinations of issues, while
also offering a tool for critically examining and contextualizing theoretical arguments.99
But studying how modalities have regulated NN in the US context alone may not be as
informative as examining them in comparison to other areas around the world. Comparing
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multiple cases studies gives an opportunity to both examine the conditions affecting each while
also highlighting their relevance in a broader context.100 Arend Lijphart notes that comparative
studies should be resorted to when the number of cases are too small for an adequate control to
be found, however in cases of comparing state approaches, their status as a unified political
body offers some baseline for comparison101 Because of this project’s focus on the regulation of
a global issue by national policy decisions, the following project compares only select case
studies of where regulatory, cultural, geographic, and economic conditions are relatively
comparable.
Starke argues the combination of qualitative analysis within comparative case study
projects offers researchers a useful method for tracing changes in decisions and beliefs,
particularly in the case of policies.102 Thus, case studies examining the regulatory effects of
these modalities with selected non-US approaches offers a tool for answering the above research
questions by contrasting the potential effects of differing conditions and policies on the
regulation of NN. These documents include, statements, testimony and financial reporting from
corporate ISP and CSP participants in the debate, as well as similar documents from civil society
organizations including legal and academic experts, governments, international governance
organizations, non-governmental organizations. Examining US and non-US approaches to these
elements in relation to each other brings into relief the failures or successes of each modality to
preserve NN in the US. Likewise, they also reveal the benefits or consequences of alternate
policy opportunities and trends which may guide the US’s approach to the debate moving
forward. For that reason, this use of comparative case studies offers a particularly useful
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method for contextualizing and unpacking the claims made by Yoo, Theierer and Epstein that
non-policy alternatives are a viable alternative to more explicit network neutrality rules.103

1.3.4

Significance
NN is a vast and complex subject that demands continued examination and analysis.

This project contributes to that body of work by offering a multi-dimensional, systematic
approach to the topic and features comparative analyses between the US approach and other
select international case studies. While Lessig has played a significant role in the NN debate and
has used the modalities approach to look at cyber-regulation, to my knowledge the approach
has not been used for an in-depth examination of network neutrality.104 This thesis shows the
utility of this approach while also seeking to categorize and clarify previously complex aspects
of neutrality regulation.
The combination of multi-dimensional analysis using Lessig’s modalities, along with
comparative case studies demonstrate how network neutrality issues are addressed (or not
addressed) in the US and abroad. As neutrality policy is being negotiated both in popular press,
academic institutions and political halls – a series of comparative case studies like this offers a
way to understand the issue’s history and conditions using multiple examples and situations.
The combination of these two approaches offers insight into NN conditions and policy
approaches that affect neutrality’s success or failure. In particular, it demonstrates the failures of
markets, architecture, or norms to exclusively preserve content non-discrimination online and
shows the need for strong policy measures to maintain certain principles of network
communication.
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1.4

Chapter outline
This project dedicates a chapter to each of the four modalities listed above as well as a

conclusion in which I outline several policy proposals based upon the findings of this
comparative analysis.
In chapter two, I outline the current state of network neutrality as it has been
acknowledged, supported or dismantled through US law and policy – primarily focusing on the
actions of the FCC, which in lieu of more direct legislation has played the most significant role
in interpreting, shaping and maintaining NN in the US. This chapter offers an overview of the
network neutrality conditions facing the US today as well as the policy approaches and their
effects. Specifically, it demonstrates the pattern of neutrality policy development from its
origins in the policies governing legacy technologies to an ongoing balance between
deregulation and the FCC’s nominal attempts to preserve the principles of content nondiscrimination and the Open Internet in the face of increasingly constraining court rulings.
Chapter three examines the architecture of the internet and the contested nature of its
structure on both infrastructural and protocol levels. Lessig emphasizes the role of code (the
actual programmed and adaptable nature of digital spaces) as well as the actual infrastructure
in dictating use, particularly online.105 This chapter highlights the competing protocols whose
evolution has shaped the potential for network management. It also focuses on the
infrastructure elements and how their relationship to each other affects the potential for
neutrality. To highlight this, I compare the US infrastructure to new nationally designed and
constructed infrastructures in Australia and New Zealand and the extent to which these designs
both preserve and potentially endanger neutrality. Likewise, it examines how architecture has
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been used not only to preserve network neutrality, but examples where architecture actively
intervenes and discriminates in the movement of online content.
Chapter four explores how markets and economics have driven much of the regulatory
discussions regarding network discrimination and neutrality.106 The vertical integration of
network and content providers is the result of increasing deregulation and laissez-faire policies
toward media organizations over the last 30 years.107 This concentration of the most powerful
network actors in concert with legal protectionism toward legacy media institutions compared
to emerging ones has only emphasized the massive market stakes of the network neutrality
debate. This chapter examines the commercial market evolution of internet access and
competition in the US and its failure to preserve neutrality. I examine how European Union
policymakers have designed and pursued policies designed to encourage market competition
through unbundling and industry-wide, principle-based strategies for encouraging neutrality
through competition. This chapter highlights the potential benefits and limitations of marketbased regulation in generating neutrality.
Chapter five shows the significance of normative views affecting the development and
continuance of network neutrality. It emphasizes the legacy of common carrier principles which
have set a historical standard for the expectations of communication networks, the perspective
of the web as a commons of equal distribution and participation has significantly affected the
expectations and descriptions of globally networked computer technology. This chapter
emphasizes the role leading public figures and civil society groups have played in the portrayal
of network neutrality and it’s representations in regards to the “open internet” in the US. This
case study highlights the role international internet governance groups such as the ITU have

106 	
  Brown	
  and	
  Marsden,	
  Regulating	
  Code;	
  Hahn	
  and	
  Wallsten,	
  “The	
  Economics	
  of	
  Net	
  

Neutrality”;	
  Atkinson,	
  “Economic	
  Doctrines	
  and	
  Network	
  Policy.”	
  
107 	
  Holt,	
  Empires	
  of	
  Entertainment,	
  13.	
  

37
played or interfered in setting international normative standards for how nations should
address the issue of network neutrality. These international standards both reflect the US’s
position and sometimes affect US policy approaches to the issue.
In the conclusion chapter, I outline some of the most significant network neutrality
policy proposals highlighted by the preceding comparative case studies. These proposals range
from the easily implemented to more complex institutional and structural changes that may
create more equitable content distribution across the internet. The differences and similarities
highlighted by the previous chapters case studies offer a range of options available for US
policy moving forward. By examining the failure of existing non-policy options for protecting
and promoting network neutrality, I emphasize a handful of common principles contributing to
ongoing network neutrality discussions.
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2

US NETWORK NEUTRALITY POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

This chapter provides a brief history of policy decisions affecting today’s
network neutrality debate. Specifically, it offers an overview of the major policy events
and shifts leading to an over-reliance on the other three modalities to preserve content
non-discrimination online. The amount of interest these principles have received is
often the result of specific historical trends in technology, markets, and norms and this
often reflects those influences.
2.1

Chasing changing technologies
Information policy has played a significant role in the rule of powerful states and

actors throughout recorded history.108 Our modern conception of media policy is far
more recent, particularly in regards to the technologies used to transmit information.109
In some ways, the Internet is unlike any previous information communication
technology. While it relies on the same interconnection and interoperability of networks
like telephone or electricity, its operations are far more decentralized and its protocols
are generally open and free to new users.110 Because of this, a wide range of authorities,
organizations with many different powers and interests have participated in setting and
maintaining internet policy.
In the political economy tradition, historical analysis plays an important role in
unpacking the movement of power and social change. Mosco notes that the study of
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history is one of the central tenants of the approach and that “one simply cannot do
good political economy without history.”111 These analyses recognize the ongoing
project of change and the influence social, economic, political and technological forces
play in both the history of events and how those events are represented.112 With that as
a guide, this chapter offers a historical revue of policy and legal choices affecting
network neutrality while avoiding falling into the trap of determinism.
In this context, it’s important to note the role of policy in this discussion. In his
outline of the four-modality approach, Lawrence Lessig summarizes that in its most
basic form, law is a form of regulation that threatens sanctions if disobeyed.113
Communication scholar Sandra Braman notes that law and policy are slightly different
aspects of governance: law offers an explicit rule, policy is a formal or semi-formal
established principle.114 As this chapter shows, the distinctions between these elements
may be significant in specific contexts (see the section on Comcast Corp. v FCC). It
should be noted, that the implications of law and policy as direct representations of the
public’s will are complex and disputed.115 However, Lessig notes that examining the
regulatory effects of law and policy are more useful lenses for studying technology and
media regulation, than focusing on the legitimacy of those laws.116
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2.1.1

A powerful place at the table
Today, the networks through which information travels have often played a

particularly influential role in enacting or avoiding policy actions. Because these
network owners are often also the owners of legacy networks (mostly telephone and
cable), they often occupy a powerful position for shaping these new technological
developments and policy.117 It should be no surprise that they have used this power to
their advantage and to protect their existing media holdings.118 Not only that, but these
few actors hold particularly powerful positions of influence with the political structure
responsible for maintaining and establishing media policy favorable to entrenched
interests.119 Holt describes the conundrum:
Converging entertainment, information, and communication industries are being
regulated by policies designed for a different era. Meanwhile, the technologies,
markets, and regulatory principles for these industries are no longer distinct
enough to accommodate separate paradigms.120
In recent decades, rapid technological changes have been to justify deregulation
and media concentration in the name of public interest.121 Network neutrality lies at the
heart of the current conflict about the role of the internet: Is it part of the commons or is
it a collection of privately operated spaces?122 For Mueller, the debate “signals a major
renegotiation of the relationship between what is private, differentiated and managed
and what is uniform and common on the internet.”123
117 	
  Wu,	
  The	
  Master	
  Switch:	
  The	
  Rise	
  and	
  Fall	
  of	
  Information	
  Empires.	
  
118 	
  Castells,	
  Communication	
  Power,	
  99.	
  
119 	
  Ibid.,	
  106–107.	
  
120 	
  Holt,	
  Empires	
  of	
  Entertainment,	
  176.	
  
121 	
  Ibid.,	
  177.	
  

122 	
  Mueller,	
  “Property	
  and	
  Commons	
  in	
  Internet	
  Governance,”	
  40.	
  
123 	
  Ibid.,	
  51.	
  

41

2.2

Policy for the public
Since early in the 20th century, media policy has sought to find a balance

between public and private interests.124 The Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which
later was renamed in 1934 as the FCC was first created to serve just this purpose –
bringing order to the onslaught of commercial radio broadcasters overlapping each
other across the airwaves that were considered in the public’s jurisdiction.125 The
commission also took a strong role in the governance of telephone networking
(dominated by the AT&T monopoly) as interconnection and long distance
communication became an increasingly valuable activity.126
Common carriage, a term now more often associated with regulating
infrastructure and monopolies, has a long legacy leading to today’s network neutrality
debate. In his work, Beyond Liberalization II, Eli Noam argues the term, first associated
with service in the public interest, extends as far back as the Roman Empire:
For centuries, common carriage principles have played an important role in the
infrastructure services of transportation and communications. They intended to
guarantee that no customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing
and able to pay the established price, however set, would be denied lawful use of
the service or would otherwise be discriminated against.127
Common Carriage rules were used to help decide liability in cases of robbery,
attack or destruction.128 Generally, common carriage rules were instituted to protect the
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public interest from abuse with an expectation of service, particularly in regards to
transportation services like railroads and transportation.129 Beginning in the mid-1800s,
municipalities and states began offering franchises to telegraph companies with the
understanding that this would provide safer conditions than allowing all comers to
construct networks.130 The legacy of this is seen today as cable and telephone operators
continue to sign exclusive franchise agreements with cities and towns.131 In the 1860s, a
series of laws passed by the US congress authorizing the expansion of telegraph
networks – with provisions that these networks offer equal access, pricing for use
without discrimination. 132 Those same protections were expanded to telephones in
1910. These policies were largely reinforced through the early 20th century, with judges
noting the public interest of common carriers and the services they provided.133 The
Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC also further clarified rules
regulating the existing monopolies of AT&T (telephone) and Western Union (telegraph)
as common carriers, subject to regulations made in the interest of the public.134 Through
subsequent revisions, the rules of common carriage have survived for
telecommunications networks – though some notable exceptions including data services
and cable television were carved out as they emerged.135
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The basis for the exclusion of internet service from common carrier obligations is
in many ways a result of its newness. Because communication policies must be
developed as the technologies emerged, rules created for previous technologies often
become the rules governing new ones. Legislation and FCC rules based on remote data
processing technology of the 1970s and cable television networks of the 1990s became
the basis for broadband’s exemption from common carriage obligations.136 The result is
a shift from common carrier providers who offered greater protection for public
interactions in exchange for private contract carriers with much greater flexibility to
grow but also more control over the content traveling across their networks.137
Whether for practical or political reasons, the FCC’s choice to separate
broadband service from the potentially onerous (but also non-discriminatory)
obligations of common carriers holds the potential for slowing innovation as well.138
Years after the 2002 cable internet order which classified broadband as an “information
service,” ISPs have become increasingly dominant and the web has become an essential
part of everyday life and commerce for many.139
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2.3

New connections: the internet emerges
Like its predecessors (radio, television and cable television) rules regarding the

internet emerged slowly.140 Originally built as decentralized network to connect
research computers, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network or ARPANET
was funded by the research division of the US Department of Defense.141 First
connected in 1969, the network linked a handful of participating research institutions
including the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and the University of Southern
California’s Information Sciences Institute (ISI) and would ultimately grow to connect
dozens of research institutions and government agencies.142
The ability to operate these connections across AT&T’s telephone network was in
part thanks to two landmark regulatory decisions. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States
and the FCC’s 1968 Carterfone ruling formed the basis for much of the nondiscrimination standards in the US.143 The Carterfone decision ended AT&T’s strict
control over the attachment of third-party devices to its network. These rulings would
pave the way for the use of telephone communication networks for other information
transmission.144 This would ultimately allow users and businesses to connect modems
and computers directly to telephone networks and the internet.
By the 1970s, telephone networks were being used not only for the transmission
conversations, but also of data. The growth of this technology allowing computers to
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transmit over traditional telephone networks led the FCC take a stronger role in
arbitrating how these actions should take place. In a series of inquiries, as Bagwell
notes, the FCC attempted to distinguish between how that information was to be
regulated: in 1966 Computer I sought to distinguish telecom technology (which is subject
to common carriage regulations) from data processing technology, while the 1979
Computer II decision separated basic (information transmitted unchanged) and
enhanced information communications.145 These inquiries established requirements
ensuring public access through regulated telecommunications infrastructure, in contrast
to broadcasting and cable transmission regulated based on content. The 1985 Computer
III inquiry proposed unbundled and equal access to basic network services, but the FCC
chose to apply these new rules only to wireline services, excluding the growing DSL
and cable broadband Internet service.146 The 1984 breakup of AT&T into eight “baby
bells” fragmented the company’s network monopoly and further increased the variety
of the networks available for all purpose, unrestricted use.147
The expansion of the internet was in part funded through the support of research
universities and institutions as well as through the financial and logistical support of
the National Science Foundation who designed and managed the initial internet
backbone known as NSFNET that connected research institutions across the country.148
The network was proposed as an alternative to the practice of leasing large
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communication pathways through telephone operators.149 With congressional support
from then-Tennessee Senator and future-Vice President Al Gore in funding for the
National Research and Education Network was passed in 1991 and helped fund
dramatic expansions for NSFNET that would ultimately be privatized in 1996.150 The
development and expansion of NSFNET helped shape the initial US infrastructure of
what would become the commercial internet.
2.4

Commercialization and deregulation
The 1990s and 2000s saw an incredible growth in internet use and popularity.

Likewise, the trends of media consolidation, concentration and deregulation that began
in the 1980s continued to expand to the emerging internet ecosystem.151 In 1997, the
Clinton administration’s “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” offered a
neutrality-like endorsement of an unrestricted internet, but this appeared to be largely
focused on supporting the economic expansion of internet services, rather than setting a
precedent for protecting content.152 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not
expressly include internet and broadband transmissions, but the law sought to
encourage expansion of service through non-intervention.153 Instead it roughly outlined
rules based on the types of technologies involved: telecommunications technology
operating on telephone wires were classified as Title II and afforded common carriage
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rules under, coaxial cable services were classified under Title VI and generally
considered entertainment, etc.154 However, the role of internet service was less clear.
Because the internet operated on both telephone and cable networks, there was a
need to clarify what rules should apply. If it was considered primarily a
telecommunications transmission, the rules of common carriage would be maintained;
if considered a cable service, greater control would remain with network operators. In
lieu of clear guidelines regarding internet classification, the US Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled common carriage telecommunications rules should apply to internet
service.155 In response, the FCC used its powerful classification powers to outline
broadband serve, not as a telecommunication service, but instead as a separate
“information” technology.156 This decision, outlined in the 2002 Cable Internet Order
issued by chairman Michael Powell, declared internet services operating on telephone
lines as not subject to common carrier protections are one such example. Claiming that
minimal regulation would spur innovation for the new medium, the order meant
internet traffic would be governed based on its use, rather than the particular
infrastructure it traveled.157
In the 2005 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X case the US
Supreme Court ruled that based in part on the FCC’s previous rules, providers should
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not be considered common carriers and were under no obligation to allow access from
other ISPs.158 Following the Brand X supreme court decision in 2005, the FCC issued a
series of broadband policy statements emphasizing access to lawful content, application
and device use as well as competition among network, application, service and content
providers.159 Despite this gesture toward neutrality, accusations of blocking and
throttling emerged. Not only after the 2005 policy was adopted, the FCC began
investigating accusations from VoIP provider Vonage that a small ISP, Madison River
Communications, was blocking its service to benefit Madison River’s own phone
services.160 In response, the FCC initiated an investigation of the blocking, but the ISP
agreed to stop targeted blocking and paid a voluntary fine to have the accusations
dismissed.161
2.5

A new hope?
Network neutrality gained prominence in national U.S. politics when in October

2007, then-Senator Barack Obama, while running for the Democratic nomination for the
2008 Presidential election, said he claimed support for net neutrality and would appoint
FCC officials who also supported the policy.162 During the 2008 campaign, Obama’s
position stood in stark contrast to that of Republican John McCain, whose platform
rejected new regulations on Internet providers in favor of voluntary access promotion
agreements.
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By May 2009, net neutrality returned to the political spotlight. In a speech on
cybersecurity, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to Network Neutrality
while emphasizing that his “administration will not dictate security standards for
private companies. On the contrary, we will collaborate with industry to find
technology solutions that ensure our security and promote prosperity."163
The FCC’s 2010 loss in a legal challenge to Comcast forced Chairman Julius
Genachowski to further clarify the FCC’s net neutrality position. Since 2007, the FCC
had taken part in an ongoing legal debate (spanning the Bush and Obama
administrations) in which the commission censured Comcast after the cable provider
was accused of throttling peer-to-peer web traffic.164 In early 2010, a federal appeals
court ruled in Comcast Corp. v. FCC in the cable company’s favor, arguing the FCC’s
policy statement was not sufficient to penalize Comcast’s actions. In other words, if the
FCC wanted to set network neutrality rules, they would have to set forth an explicit
order, rather than a vague policy.
With the Comcast case as the background, Genachowski outlined new, clearer
neutrality rules. The chairman emphasized the need for rules to preserve an open
Internet and those established rules would serve as the basis for case-by-case
enforcement of policies by the FCC.165 The FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order consisted of
three rules intended to build on the four neutrality-like 2005 policies.166 The order
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included three elements: transparency, no blocking and no unreasonable
discrimination. Under the order, internet providers would be held to a new standard of
transparency regarding network management practices, though they would not be
required to reveal sensitive business information. Next, the rule prohibited blocking
content online. Finally, the rule prohibited providers from discriminating, slowing, or
disfavoring of lawful content. The latter two rules include exception for “reasonable
network management” which as is noted in later chapters, has become a contentious
issue.167 The Chairman defended these policies in 2011 before the House of
Representatives Committee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet
arguing they were necessary to ensure fairness and competition online.168
NN in the U.S. remained relatively stable and under-the-radar until the
announcement of the 2014 Verizon vs. FCC ruling formally decisively throwing out the
2010 open internet orders. Despite the ruling’s elimination of the existing network
neutrality orders, the Obama administration argued it would continue to support open
internet policies. In a virtual forum event, Obama emphasized his continued support
for NN as well as his confidence in recently appointed FCC chair (and former telecom
investor) Tom Wheeler’s commitment to the issue.169 Despite this recommitment to the
issue, Wheeler emphasized the FCC would neither appeal the Verizon ruling, nor would
it immediately reclassify internet services as a common carrier protected
telecommunications service but instead seek to use commissions newly-confirmed
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regulatory powers confirmed in the ruling.170 Less than a month after the Open Internet
Order was issued, telecommunications giant Verizon filed suit with the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia claiming the agency’s order overstepped
its authority to regulate the web based on the FCC’s previous rulings.171
2.6

Back to the drawing board
After years in court, the US Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Verizon in

January 2014. In the decision, the court arguing that while the FCC had jurisdiction to
regulate internet services (under the 1996 Act’s Section 706,) but blocking and
discrimination prohibitions of the 2010 Open Internet Order were too similar to
common carriage regulations and therefore were dismissed.172 The decision was clear:
the US would need to find a different approach for preserving network neutrality.
In February 2014, recently-appointed FCC Wheeler outlined the FCC’s new
approach which included: Retooled nondiscrimination, anti-blocking and transparency
rules; new attempts to examine reclassification; seek public comment; and support
growing public and local competition to ISPs.173 To the concern of NN advocates, the
FCC’s initial proposal also suggested opportunities for ISPs to create “fast lanes” –
channels of web traffic that could be treated differently than existing internet service.174
While the commission continues to accept comments regarding the proposed rules, in a
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congressional hearing Wheeler claimed “fast lanes” would violate the “commercially
reasonable” wording of the FCC’s proposed rules.175
While reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications may be potentially
disruptive, few options are left for enforcing equal network access and nondiscrimination. Following the Verizon ruling open-internet advocates and organizations
like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which have previously resisted
endorsement of reclassification, announced their public support for applying common
carriage rules to the web.176 McMillan suggests reclassification may be one of the FCC’s
only options for re-balancing the power between ISPs and users:
[Reclassification] would give the FCC the regulatory teeth needed to keep
internet access open in a reasonable way to make sure that service providers
don’t grow into kingmakers—deciding which online companies can flourish on
the net and which can’t.”177
With the potential of reclassification remains open, legislation has been introduced
to the US House of Representatives that would ban reclassification before it could
occur.178 In fact, a number of bills - both supporting and opposing network neutrality –
have been introduced in the US congress in 2014, but given its recent gridlock, these are
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probably more likely to be political gestures rather than realistic solutions.179 It should
be noted that telecom corporations have invested a tens of millions of dollars into
lobbying against network neutrality and in 2013 anti-neutrality donors outspent proneutrality lobbyists 3-1.180
2.7

Conclusion
In attempting to both regulate and promote the economic success of both

involved industries (not to mention satisfy the public’s demand for fast, reliable and
affordable Internet access,) the U.S. government leadership and the FCC are in the
uncomfortable position of attempting to satisfy all involved parties. While legislators in
congress have visited the issue on a number of occasions and proposed a handful of
unsuccessful bills both for and against more formal neutrality, there appears to have
been little incentive by lawmakers to pursue the issue further.181 This chapter’s
historical overview of US network neutrality policy has shown that combination of
elements has denied, diluted, delayed, or dismissed attempts to codify clear, firm nondiscrimination rules. While there have been attempts to expand these principles, they
have been instead thwarted by competing interests. The result has been piecemeal steps
toward creating a relevant and enforceable network neutrality policy. These halfmeasures in lieu of more robust policy culminated in the 2014 Verizon ruling nullifying
the FCC’s 2010 attempts at a establishing a neutrality standard.
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Previously, the FCC’s minimalist and non-binding approach to NN relied on the
continuing norms of non-discriminatory content treatment, competition between
market actors and the development of architecture encoded with these priorities.
However, each of these in their current condition is not enough to preserve NN across
the web. Examining each of these three aspects of network neutrality separately and in
relation to similar conditions throughout the world gives a clearer vision of the
structure of online interaction and governance as well as a potential vision for its future.
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3

NEUTRALITY AND ARCHITECTURE

This chapter examines the architectural regulation of network neutrality. In
particular, it highlights both the power and malleability of architecture as a tool for
regulating behavior. While some elements of the internet architecture like end-to-end
protocols appear to encourage content non-discrimination, other elements like the
infrastructure for managing these increasingly-popular networks have also been used to
exert unprecedented power of communication flows. The infrastructure of the web
extends great distances and consists of many levels of both physical and digital
structures. In Australia and New Zealand there have been attempts to reshape the
architecture of the internet through new high-capacity infrastructure initiatives, but
while these new architectures are different from those in the US, so far they appear to
have done little to affect the power imbalances between network operators and users.
3.1

An invisible regulator
Architecture is an incredibly influential but sometimes-invisible aspect of the

Internet ecosystem. Features built into the architecture of the web have shaped network
neutrality’s existence and undoubtedly will shape its future. This architecture includes
not only the physical connections within and between networks, but also the protocols
that dictate how information is handled as it moves between users.
Internet architecture is generally sorted into organizational levels called “layers,”
each of which pertain to different aspects of the information transport system. There
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have been many attempts at creating an ideal layers model.182 Most generally accepted
models describes four such layers: the physical infrastructure (computers, routers and
cables,) the logical or protocol layer, the application layer (such as a website or
application or media player) and content (the actual information being sent and
received).183 While each of these layers is important for the design and execution of
globally connected computer networks, the next sections focus in particular on the first
two: the physical infrastructure layer and the protocol layer.
Incremental architecture choices during the internet’s growth both allowed for
the development of network neutrality just as similar choices by network operators are
increasingly eroding that same neutrality. This can be seen in the shift of guiding
protocols from an earlier end-to-end to more current quality-of-service questions of
which focus less on equality of transmission than on network management.
In the US, these shifts away from neutrality are also seen in the concentration
and powerful role infrastructure owners and organizations have taken in determining
the shape of the web. However, not all internet infrastructures are created or managed
equally. In the past, these network owners and operators have claimed neutrality stands
in the way of future development, but the cases of new centralized broadband
architecture projects in Australia and New Zealand call these assumptions and the
larger role of architecture in internet regulation into question.
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3.1.1

Building for openness, or control
Lessig argues that the modality of architecture in cyberspace, consisting of

structure and protocol choices, is particularly powerful for determining user behavior
and the networks’ potential.184 The structure and rules guiding how these networks
operate is neither accidental nor is it discovered, but instead the result of conscious
choices codified into the system.185 Not surprisingly, these architectural choices may also
be the result of policy guidance, market forces, or established norms. As the desires of
network managers or users change, so do the networks themselves. Some computer
networks may be both programmed to promote content openness and increased access.
Others work to maintain censorship and steer traffic to enrich those controlling the
networks. Changes to these networks are often made by a small group rather than
publically negotiated and those choices form a kind of invisible, privatized law
regulating behavior.186
Lessig notes that depending on these structural choices, architecture may be
wielded as a tool for information freedom or repression:
If some architectures are more regulable than others—if some give governments
more control than others— then governments will favor some architectures more
than others. Favor, in turn, can translate into action, either by governments, or
for governments. Either way, the architectures that render space less regulable
can themselves be changed to make the space more regulable.187
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In other words: when parameters of behavior are dictated by the architecture,
rather than through explicit laws, design principles become substitutes for public
policy. Lessig suggests the public should consciously consider whether online
architectures reflect the values and needs of the larger public, rather than the choices of
network programmers and operators.188 He argues this balance justifies the actions of
regulators to reconcile network design with public needs.189 But as the ongoing network
neutrality debate shows, the process of changing code is rarely that simple.
While Lessig and others have said the origins of the internet are based in the
principles of content non-discrimination and reasonable access online, the malleability
of internet architecture and infrastructure means those principles are far from
guaranteed. Instead, the weakening of the network neutrality principles embedded in
the internet’s architecture is the result of choices by powerful network operators to
favor their own control or profits over the needs of the public at large.
3.1.2

Building neutrality
The design and structure of the internet is incredibly complex and technical, but

unpacking the primary discussions regarding its protocols and physical infrastructure
is vital for unpacking architecture’s affect on network neutrality. This chapter examines
some of the most conspicuous architecture issues supporting and sometimes hindering
NN. The Internet has changed immensely since it’s beginning. The initial design of the
internet – going as far back as its Defense Department and academic origins with
ARPANET – was based on a decentralized structure enshrined in the non188 	
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discriminating, first-come-first-serve protocols of TCP/IP programming.190 Protocols
like HTTP and SFTP were designed for all types of users to openly access, develop for,
and create content and they continue to be used today.191 For these reasons, neutrality
advocates argue the internet was built on a foundation of network neutrality.
But NN opponents argue today’s demands on the internet require new
approaches and designs and offer a handful of claims to justify greater control of how
users access the web. They claim the physical costs of internet infrastructure and the
burden of the web’s heaviest users warrants new tools and policies for managing how
information moves across the networks. In addition to the cost of physical architecture,
they argue the changing nature of web 2.0 and increasingly demanding applications
(like video streaming, VoIP, IPTV, etc.) warrant more complex procedures,
mechanisms, and protocols.192 ISPs and network operators claim the heaviest users
stress the network and penalize average users by occupying a fixed amount of
bandwidth and transmission space while still paying the same rates.193 They also claim
strong network management allows for content and applications online, while
potentially arbitrary regulations on these tools may have unforeseen and potentially
harmful effects on the future development of the network of networks.194
But it remains worth considering whether increased network management
ultimately serves the needs of internet’s users or merely enriches private corporate
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network operators and owners. Because the internet was initially built with public
resources, there is a legitimate claim that decisions regarding its use and design should
be made with the public’s interest primarily in mind.195 However, understanding the
many levels upon which these decisions can be made requires a more sophisticated
explanation of the internet’s architecture.
3.1.3

An ally or a threat
At its simplest, internet networking is a system which allows information broken

into electronic packets to be transferred from a computer in one location to another
computer in another location and vice versa.196 These computers may be directly
connected to each other, but more often the information travels across great distances,
changing hands through multiple routing devices and networks. The protocols of the
internet are designed to move data to the first available open path, however direct, or
indirect it may be from its intended destination.197 Generally, internet protocols are
designed to move data in most direct path to its destination, but if networks are
congested that same data may be sent on a more complex or longer path if that path
becomes open first.
However, the features of both the physical and protocol layers continue to
change as the network management tools become more sophisticated. Network owners
may respond to user traffic by prioritizing protocols to encourage particular types of
behavior that services there interests. For example, smart networks may send certain
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types of data (like prioritized video) on direct paths, while less desired data (like peerto-peer transfers) is sent to longer, slower routes. Similarly, the physical infrastructure
of the internet, made possible through complex technological and economic
connections, affects how quickly and efficiently data moves between users and across
networks. The types of connections available and the agreements between
infrastructure owners like backbone providers and last-mile network providers affects
how easily and affordably users can connect to each other. Without network neutrality
rules, the manipulation of protocols and infrastructure by network owners/operators is
a particularly invisible and powerful tool for altering or blocking the movement of
content online.
3.2

Protocols: equality versus quality
To highlight the malleability of internet architecture and its flexibility to function

as both a foundation for network neutrality or the source of its undoing, I will highlight
two competing protocols which operate within the TCP/IP system. On the one hand,
the End-to-End (or e2e) model emphasizes the role of senders and receivers on each
“end” of a digital communication with little network interference in between. On the
other, Quality of Service (or QoS) emphasizes measures within a network to ensure
transmissions are received fully and accurately. McKelvey notes the choice to structure
networks focus on either protocol may result in significant effects:
The E2E model overlooks the connections, but fully recognizes the ends. The QoS
model devalues the ends as contributors to the network in favour of centralized
hubs serving content and ensuring proper transport. These tensions are
political—a source of conflict, not consensus.”198
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Each of these models offers benefits and consequences for both users and
network operators with widely different implications for network neutrality.
3.2.1

End to end
The end-to-end model has served as the basis for the open, interconnected

architecture of the Internet.199 It describes one of the most basic elements of the packet
switching algorithms that constitute the TCP/IP systems still used online today. In the
most basic sense, e2e focuses encoding and decoding at the computer it is sent and
received, rather than being processed at an intermediary during transmission. This
process, outlined by David Reed, David Clark, and Jerome Saltzer in the 1984 paper
“End-to-End Arguments in System Design,” downplays the importance of the network
itself and instead relies on the “ends” for processing the information.200
Vinton Cerf, one of the developers of the TCP/IP protocols argues this pattern
was chosen intentionally:
The Internet was designed to allow applications to reside essentially at the
'edges' of the network, rather than in the core of the network itself. This is
precisely the opposite of the traditional telephony and cable networks, where
applications and content are implemented in the core (in headends and central
offices), away from the users at the edge.201
But the success of this style of protocol was not guaranteed during the
development of early computer networking technologies. Between the 1970s and 1990s
other competition included Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocol, which

199 	
  Whitt,	
  “A	
  Deference	
  to	
  Protocol.”	
  

200 	
  McKelvey,	
  “Ends	
  and	
  Ways,”	
  59;	
  Wu,	
  The	
  Master	
  Switch:	
  The	
  Rise	
  and	
  Fall	
  of	
  Information	
  

Empires,	
  449.	
  
201 	
  Cerf,	
  “The	
  Open	
  Internet:	
  What	
  It	
  Is,	
  and	
  Why	
  It	
  Matters.”	
  

63

favored more centralized network processing and slower, less versatile (but more
reliable) data transfer protocols.202 Ultimately, TCP/IP’s usability and popularity among
both professionals and enthusiasts along with its ability to work on many physical
platforms contributed to its ultimate success and growth.203 At the time, OSI offered
better tools for network security and had slowly begun to gain popularity, particularly
among European governments, but TCP/IP’s established reputation and proven
interoperability/compatibility led to its popularity over the other competing protocol
suites.204
Lessig has argued the simplicity of the internet’s e2e architecture is a key factor
in its success.205 He notes the flexibility of e2e allows for maximum participation within
the network – which ultimately contributes to its overall value.206 This design structure
allows the infrastructure to remain relatively simple while pushing “complexity to the
edge of the network—to the applications that run on the network, rather than the
network’s core.”207 This principle serves as the basis upon which a great deal of pronetwork neutrality arguments rest: that interference through blocking, discrimination or
altering of content as it travels across a network interferes with the original design
principles of the internet.208
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The simplicity of e2e may be both its greatest strength and weakness. By design,
packets transmitted using e2e design are sent and received “first-come, first-serve”
regardless of the content it is transporting. Marsden notes “E2E is a two-edged sword,
with advantages of openness and a dumb network, and disadvantages of congestion,
jitter and ultimately a slowing rate of progress for high-end applications such as high
definition video.”209 Pure end-to-end, first-come, first-serve transmission relying only on
the basic TCP/IP protocols may be disastrous for more advanced and data-heavy
applications.210 In some ways, the network congestion, which network operators argue
justifies increasingly intrusive traffic management methods, is in part the result of the
internet’s original e2e protocols.211
To illustrate this, briefly consider how they may apply to a different form of
traffic – auto traffic. Imagine a hypothetical highway between two cities that follows a
pure e2e design. This highway would have no speed limits, no traffic signals, and no
customs for managing traffic such as slower vehicles keeping in the outside lanes. If all
vehicles traveling on the highway are relatively equal, they may all be able to travel
more easily (and possibly efficiently) than on a managed highway. However, as
different types of vehicles like large trucks (VoIP) or slower, heavy equipment
(streaming video) enter the highway, the ability to use the road optimally will reduce.
The only e2e solutions available would be to construct additional roads between the
cities or widen the existing road (increase bandwidth.)

209 	
  Marsden,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality,”	
  110.	
  
210 	
  Yoo,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality	
  and	
  the	
  Economics	
  of	
  Congestion,”	
  1862.	
  
211 	
  McKelvey,	
  “Ends	
  and	
  Ways,”	
  58.	
  

65

Because of these concerns, both neutrality supporters and opponents accept
some degree of network management. Increasingly large and sensitive types of content
and growing user numbers has warranted the need for new protocols for managing the
internet. These new principles have increasingly become just as significant to the
Internet as the e2e principles found within TCP/IP. But while these management
protocols bring order to the potential chaos of a pure e2e network, they also open the
door for potential abuse by network owners.
3.2.2

Quality of service
In response to the congestion of first-come, first-serve data transmission by the

web’s original e2e protocols, network owners have increasingly implemented
algorithms to manage data as it travels through their switches, servers and systems.
These Quality of Service (“QoS”) protocols preserve a basic expectation of service
based on access to a given network and ensure traffic of greatly different needs is
delivered successfully.212 With some web services (video streaming, large downloads,
etc.) requiring more bandwidth than others, network owners argue they need tools to
manage how bandwidth is used to ensure all customers receive a basic level of
connectivity.213
The specific types of QoS algorithms used have significant effects on the travel of
data. Some may schedule how often certain types of data are allowed to move, others
shape traffic by spreading packets rather than allowing them to come all at once, others
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may block or prohibit certain types of traffic altogether.214 In that sense, some low-level
content discrimination is already built into today’s internet networks. Today’s ISP
routers are designed to prioritize (or buffer) certain types of traffic over others with
time-sensitive packets, like video conferencing, are put ahead of regular traffic like
visiting a website or watching a small video.215
While some oppose any network discrimination, a basic level of QoS
management is acceptable to most NN supporters, though the limits of what constitutes
an “acceptable” management remains up for debate.216 Without some QoS management,
data-intensive services (VoIP and Video Streaming) would be inefficient or impossible
given the existing internet bandwidth for most users.217 For this reason, some argue
traffic management and other QoS processes are vital to the continued innovation of the
web and its increasingly central role in the midst of technological convergence.218
Network providers and ISPs have invested heavily in technologies like Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI) for transmitting, managing and identifying types of packets
with increasing accuracy.219 These QoS technologies also give ISPs and networks tools to
pick and choose some content over others. In an example from 2008, when the FCC
responded strongly to Comcast’s data tracking and deliberately reducing of bandwidth
(“throttling”) of Peer-to-Peer users, the company responded by instituting usage caps in
214 	
  Peha,	
  The	
  Benefits	
  and	
  Risks	
  of	
  Mandating	
  Network	
  Neutrality,	
  and	
  the	
  Quest	
  for	
  a	
  

Balanced	
  Policy,	
  5–6.	
  
215 	
  Marsden,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality,”	
  86.	
  
216 	
  Wu,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality,	
  Broadband	
  Discrimination”;	
  Lessig,	
  “In	
  Support	
  of	
  Network	
  
Neutrality”;	
  Brown	
  and	
  Marsden,	
  Regulating	
  Code,	
  143.	
  
217 	
  McKelvey,	
  “Ends	
  and	
  Ways.”	
  
218 	
  Zelnick,	
  The	
  Illusion	
  of	
  Net	
  Neutrality,	
  153–155.	
  
219 	
  Brown	
  and	
  Marsden,	
  Regulating	
  Code,	
  142,	
  177.	
  

67

the name of QoS.220 Peha argues “it is cost-effective for a network operator to gain
unprecedented knowledge about what is happening on the network, and to selectively
improve or degrade service for some.”221 This may be as light as monitoring use to
gather advertising information or as drastic as censoring certain content. Mueller and
Asghari suggest the publicity from incidents like the Comcast case may lead to greater
public scrutiny of ISPs and their monitoring, fostering reductions in the reported use of
DPI technology.222
As will be discussed below, these QoS technologies like DPI can be mobilized
beyond commercial uses. They may also be used as tools for political surveillance and
censorship. The accuracy of this technology allows ISPs to identify and slow politically
sensitive or illegal data, or isolate user data for more accurate marketing or advertising.
The emphasis by network owners on QoS echoes the initial concerns of telephone
and telegraph networks concerned about the clarity of transmissions and methods for
improving transmission rates and reducing congestion.223 The creation of ARPANET
and its decentralized e2e transmissions was a radical shift from previous
communication networks. Some have argued, dramatic increases in last-mile
bandwidth may reduce or eliminate the need for service-management algorithms.224
Despite this speculation, unless there is strong intervention from regulators or public
outcry, there is little reason to believe technologies like DPI will become less prevalent
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as network owners see opportunities to exert more control over networks. The historical
pattern of network owners has been one of control, management and monetization
rather than restraint.
3.3

Infrastructure: the physical web
Internet protocols may be different than those of previous communication

technologies, they often travel on the infrastructure of legacy networks and the
structure of these networks and their ownership has had significant effects on network
neutrality. While today’s in the US is not dominated by a single monopoly like AT&T
once dominated the telephone market, some have argued a similar level of network
control now exists in the hands of a handful of broadband providers.225 Telephone-style
network policies were designed with relatively consistent information loads, with the
exception of a few dedicated lines. Users who needed more access to the phone network
purchased more individual lines.
In the 1970s with the advent of fax machines, telephone text transmission, and
computer networking across telephone lines, new policies had to be created to deal with
these new architectural needs. Any shift away from NN and flat rate pricing represents
a shift away from how information networks have so far been regulated by the FCC.226
As computer networks play an increasingly large role and as their infrastructure is
adapted and updated to face increasingly large information and content loads, the
legacy of previous structural and technology choices remains.
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3.3.1

Connecting the tubes
As discussed in chapter two, the expansion of these computer connections across

phone lines was enabled by Carterphone and Hush-a-Phone rulings which allowed users
and businesses to connect modems and computers directly to telephone networks and
ultimately the internet. Previously these connections were only available to academic
institutions and the largest corporations who leased access to the AT&T wires. In the
wake of the 1984 break up of AT&T, interconnection allowed these connections to
continue and flourish. The flexibility of TCP/IP networking meant many types of
network technologies could be connected to other networks and ultimately to create a
global internet. In the late 1970s and 1980s the majority of the internet consisted of
university and government agencies, early consumer modems and internet services
began to emerge.227
In 1985, the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) was created to link
academic supercomputers across the US using TCP/IP protocols and grew to become
part of the foundation of the modern internet backbone.228 The network was dedicated
to the distribution of research and scholarly work, built with a combination of public
and private partnerships grew to reach across the country and grew to offer connections
to 16 research institutions and multiple regional networks.229 In 1997 NSFNET was
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privatized and replaced with connections to privately-operated backbone networks,
and regional networks were replaced by regional ISPs.230
The first consumer online service, CompuServe was launched in 1979 and
offered basic text information, news and early email service to users who paid by the
minute and connected through dial-up modems.231 Other consumer dial-up services like
the UNIX-based USENET bulletin board service also began to grow in popularity
during that time.232 Through the ‘80s and ‘90s Consumer internet access use continued
to grow competition came from a variety of connection types including dial-up
connections through telephone lines where customers could choose an ISP among a
variety of providers, DSL which also operated on existing telephone network or cable
internet which transmitted through existing cable television infrastructure.233
Just as architecture allows certain types of behavior, policy is a reflection or
rebuttal to these designs. The 2003 FCC Cable Internet Order that declared internet
services operating on telephone lines as not subject to common carrier protections are
one such example. While the flexibility of the web to adapt to a wide variety of alreadyestablished communications networks has been a feature of internet technology, the
historical regulatory approaches linked to those legacy networks has had a significant
impact on network neutrality/open internet discussion. Questions of common carrier
access or private network control have been raised about these legacy networks. While
broadcast and cable networks have historically and legally been found to have a degree
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of independence in content choice as far back as the Communications Act of 1934,
likewise telephone and telegraph networks were held to non-discrimination rules like
common carrier.234
While Internet technology is sui generis, policy approaches to it reflect those
made about previous technologies. Thus the NN debate, is in part about whether the
internet communication networks are more similar to telecommunications networks
(connecting users to users) or cable/broadcasting networks (connecting content
providers to users.) The reality is much more complex. The Internet ‘s architecture
reflects aspects of both of these and more. This is particularly apparent when looking
beyond ISPs and users to the larger institutions and networks that make up the global
Internet infrastructure.
3.3.2

Interconnection and peering
The physical connections and structure of the internet have continued to change

as well, becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. Most NN discussions have
focused on the “last mile” or the connection between customers and the larger network.
In the case of wired broadband in the US, these connections are largely through digital
subscriber line (DSL) operating through telephone wires, coaxial (cable) connections, or
fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) service. The first two operate in part on the infrastructure
of previous to-the-home technologies (cable television and telephone service) that have
been adapted and upgraded to allow high-speed information transfer while the latter
often requires brand-new infrastructure and connections to homes or businesses.
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Figure 3.1 A diagram of complex infrastructure relationships.

Beyond the “last mile” the network and its connections becomes much more
complex (see Figure 3.1). Last-mile network operators (which are almost all now ISPs or
companies connecting users to the larger internet-based network) are connected
through fiber-optic cable to a variety of networks including other networks, often called
the “middle mile.”235 The largest of these are Backbone (Tier 1) providers, including
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AT&T, Verizon, Level 3 and TeliaSonera, which provide the largest, and longest
connections across land and sea.236 Because they transmit huge, fairly equal amounts of
data these Tier 1 providers connect and share data through free peering agreements.237
Because they reach a smaller number of users, regional (Tier 2 or 3) networks, like
Vodafone or even Comcast, may pay Tier 1 providers for access to their larger
networks.238 These payments are called transit or interconnection agreements.
While not classically regarded as NN, these agreements as well as the
implementation of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) ultimately affect the movement
of information online, data congestion and ultimately the need for neutrality
regulations. As CSPs have grown increasingly large and popular, they have
increasingly relied on the implementation of CDNs or servers directly connected to
backbone or ISPs that allow information to move directly within the ISP’s network
instead of across potentially thousands of miles.239 In lieu of direct pricing tiers based on
content users access, ISPs and CSPs have increasingly negotiated these partnerships for
the heaviest or most time-sensitive online applications. Notable participants include
Google, ESPN, Microsoft, and Netflix, the latter of which has publically opposed CDN
pricing in a series of public dust-ups with both Comcast and Verizon.240 In part these
public disagreements stem from content providers attempting to negotiate
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interconnection with backbone providers like Cogent or Level 3 without brokering
similar deals with last-mile ISPs.
These agreements are potentially a strong deviation from the classic conception
of fair and reasonable information transport.241 Because of the dearth of last-mile service
providers, ISPs have incredible leverage to charge whatever they like in exchange for
fast transport. Under this system, Marsden argues “content is therefore already
delivered at different speeds depending on the paid priority the content provider
assigns to it, but not the ISPs’ policies.”242 These CDN and interconnection agreements
echo the programming negotiations between cable providers and content channels243 In
fact, Comcast has leveraged its large infrastructure and huge last-mile user base to
negotiate peering agreements with most Tier 1 networks and only pays a minor transit
agreements fee for international connections.244
Many (including open-internet advocates) argue CDNs add value to user
experience online and for the most part do not negatively affect the last-mile of internet
service.245 However, these agreements may endanger network neutrality in the long
term. Feld argues premium service agreements and interconnection agreements rely on
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bandwidth scarcity and therefore discourage ISPs from investing in faster networks.246
Feld argues:
The incentive for content providers and others to build CDNs and similar
infrastructure is diminished if broadband access providers can block, degrade or
prioritize the last mile traffic. Why bother to ship stuff express if it’s going to sit
three days extra on the loading dock unless I grease the palms of the broadband
access provider that’s supposed to deliver it? Similarly, the incentive for
broadband access providers themselves to invest declines when they can
‘monetize the scarcity’ by charging more for prioritization.247
These concerns as well as the previously-mentioned Netflix-Verizon dispute in
the midst of the FCC’s 2014 reworking of its NN policies has led to FCC chairman
Wheeler to announce the commission would examine the effects these negotiations and
their impact on congestion for internet users.248 CDN agreements represent an
increasingly significant change in the how traffic moves across the internet. With CDNs
for the most popular sites, data is no longer travelling across great distances, but is
instead cached in ISP servers near users. As demand for faster speeds increases, content
providers are faced with brokering paid interconnection agreements with ISPs or face
slower speeds. Holt argues these CDNs are effectively a loophole to neutrality rules:
While technically legal, these payments certainly flout the spirit of the 2010 Open
Internet Rules, which are intended to preserve a democratic Internet and
maintain similar standards of service regardless of the senders’ ability to pay for
a speedier delivery of their content at any point in the process. They also
disadvantage smaller players who can ill afford to pay for this direct access, and
consequently limit the range of creative possibilities for connected viewing.249
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Without greater scrutiny of these practices or more robust network neutrality
policies, infrastructure negotiations between the largest network and content providers
may increasingly shape the content internet users access. Although many users in the
US see little fixed broadband ISP competition, increased bandwidth through
technological improvements may render concerns about congestion obsolete.
3.3.3

The end of congestion?
Dramatic changes in bandwidth capacity and traffic volume have become a

staple of internet’s development. In part, network neutrality opponents argue this
limited capacity warrants increasingly sophisticated tools for managing content and
traffic. However, some suggest congestion concerns may be overstated. For example,
Hass argues that while telecommunications service and IP service are dramatically
different (particularly in how they allocate traffic across networks) – network owners,
which are generally telecommunications companies, continue to pursue telecom
solutions like price discrimination.250 Regardless of bandwidth improvements, dramatic
increases in data compression and faster buffering may greatly reduce or greatly
eliminate “congestion” as a justification for QoS tinkering or content discrimination by
ISPs.251
As globally networked information networks continue to evolve and legacy
media moves to the IP network, the policies of network owners may move away from
telecom-based business strategies. The growth of investment in last-mile FTTP
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networks may bring much greater bandwidth to users and at least temporarily reduce
concerns about last-mile congestion. The expense of developing FTTP infrastructure
may mean the total effects of this increased access may be far away. Nonetheless,
roughly 22% of global internet users have fiber connections, a little over 19% use cable
and the remaining 55% using copper or DSL connections according to the ITU’s 2013
state of broadband report.252
In the US, only about 10% of US households have direct FTTP connections;
instead roughly 60% of households connect to the internet through cable with,
according to the FCC’s 2014 Fixed Broadband Report.253 The popularity of cable internet
systems has been in part due to the existing infrastructure which provides faster speeds
than DSL, with lower overhead than building fiber networks. While fiber services like
Verizon’s FiOS network have been plagued by expensive setbacks and criticism from
investors less eager to invest capital in the costly network.254
The expansion of new infrastructure with greater capacity may offer one
architectural answer to network neutrality concerns. New entrants like Google and
some municipalities have started to construct their own fiber networks and incumbents
like AT&T have begun expanding FTTP access to users to keep up.255 This new
competition from new fiber networks may pressure incumbent DSL and cable ISPs to
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increase available speeds.256 The promise of an exclusively IP-based infrastructure could
eventually bring potentially lower infrastructure costs and better service. Isenberg
suggests the flexibility of IP to operate on any network with little intra-network
modification is one of its strengths – and that will only increase as advanced IP-based
networks expand.257
3.4

Alternative approaches to architecture
The versatility of basic internet protocols like TCP/IP have been able to span the

world connecting diverse groups with access to many different technological systems.
Lantham argues “the very nature of the Internet is relatively exceptional in
telecommunications history because, as an internetwork, it directly and indirectly links
a diverse range of not just national but subnational, regional, and global networks.”258
Yet while these different places share common protocols, history, geography,
economics, and politics have created sometimes widely different infrastructures.
Noam argues there are relationships between the need for certain types of
internet regulations and the economic/infrastructure development within countries. He
argues countries with existing commercial/cable networks (the US, Canada, South
Korea, and European areas like Switzerland and some Scandinavian countries) require
additional investment in competing network technologies.259 In comparison, other lessdeveloped countries offering “a single-provider copper/DSL phone infrastructure”
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should focus on the development fiber construction with policies encouraging open
access.260 Unfortunately, infrastructure development plans are rarely simple.
National broadband plans are not uncommon. According to the International
Telecommunications Union over 134 countries had adopted national broadband plans
by 2013 – these range from basic outlines of strategies for improving affordability,
access, and speeds to more complex, multi-year complete overhauls of national
infrastructure and policy.261 Some of the most prominent success stories of public
broadband investment strategies include Japan and South Korea, which each boast over
90% broadband penetration and lead OECD countries in fiber infrastructure.262 The
expansion of the South Korean infrastructure is in part due to the country’s existing
cable television coverage along with an $800 million USD infrastructure improvement
investment plan completed in 2005.263 In Japan, fiber development has been ongoing
since the 1990s and competitive unbundling policies (more on those in chapter 4) have
been in place since 2001.264 It’s worth nothing that both South Korea and Japan have
adopted policies regarding network neutrality and traffic management.265 Dense
populations have made the rapid development of ultra-fast fiber infrastructure in these
countries easier and more affordable.266
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While the US internet infrastructure is largely the result of a long history public
development (ARPANET and NSFNET) along with the connection to private networks
like AT&T and cable operators, what affordances can be offered by designing and
construction a new national broadband infrastructure today and can these
infrastructures instill or preserve network neutrality? The examples of Australia and
New Zealand illustrate particularly ambitious approaches to improving broadband
systems. Each proposes to construct separate, ultra-fast fiber infrastructures to connect
the majority of their respective residents.267
3.4.1

Building from the ground up
The following cases examines two particular projects – the National Broadband

Network (NBN) in Australia and the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) project in New
Zealand which both seek to overhaul their respective countries broadband
infrastructure to increase access and speeds. While both represent huge investments in
time and capital to re-construct broadband access, they also show that network
neutrality must be actively pursued rather than neglected in favor of fast connections.
These new networks are being built in two countries where network neutrality is
virtually non-existent. Instead, ISPs in Australia and New Zealand charge users based
on usage or for a limited amount of content with data caps.268 Generally, both countries
have favored infrastructure unbundling and ISP competition over more formal
neutrality regulations.269 In fact, in 2008 a handful of Australian ISP leaders told the
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online technology publication ZDNet that NN was an “American problem” created
because US ISPs offered unlimited bandwidth instead of recouping costs through usage
fees.270 In that interview, at least one ISP leader echoed the claim that fees were
necessary to build faster networks, however the new government-funded broadband
infrastructures in Australia and New Zealand may challenge that assertion.
3.4.2

New Zealand
New Zealand’s “Ultra Fast Broadband” invested an estimated $1.1 billion in US

dollars on a ten-year plan to extend fiber to nearly 75 percent of the country’s
residents.271 The plan involves a massive restructuring of the internet ecosystem in New
Zealand. This includes splitting the deregulated, formerly state-run monopoly provider
Telecom NZ into a new company Chorus to administer the new network that is
available to competing ISPs.272 Also as part of the plan, these ISPs must adhere to a
variety of transparency and non-discrimination requirements as the plan is
implemented.273
The construction of the fiber from homes to the network was undertaken by
partnerships between the state-funded Crown Fibre Holdings company and a series of
partnerships with private companies.274 Initially, the development of last-mile and
backbone would be funded and constructed separately through these public-private
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partnerships and ultimately operated separately in addition to retail ISPs – however it
became clear to regulators in 2010 that separate markets for these two elements was
unfeasible.275 Because of the cost to investors and complications of implementing this
initial plan and the new strategy reduced the potential competition by making the
networks more vertical.276 The country’s centralized broadband plan represents a
rejection of privatization, in favor of the construction and ownership of a new stateowned infrastructure.277
While the development of fast fiber networks is ambitious, the prospects for the
UFB’s success among users remains unclear. Conditions carried over from previous
internet services threaten to slow or delay the benefits of fiber expansion in New
Zealand. In particular, Dwayne Winseck notes the previous heavy use of expensive and
restrictive bandwidth caps in New Zealand may discourage users from seeing the need
to switch to faster fiber connections.278 While the country’s government continues to
pursue strategies to convince customers to switch from DSL and copper connections to
fiber, they have done little to address underlying concerns like such as content
discrimination and onerous data caps.279
3.4.3

Australia
In Australia, a similarly ambitious plan is underway, but since its introduction in

2007, the construction of the country’s National Broadband Network (NBN) has faced a
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number of challenges.280 Geographically, extending broadband to citizens throughout
the entire continent is a challenge – the plan is designed to construct FTTH in many of
the most populated areas and wireless broadband or satellite connections to those in the
remote Australian outback.281 In part, the government-backed and funded design offers
the promise of connecting residents who otherwise would be too costly to connect to
and therefore had been avoided by commercial networks.282 Like the New Zealand plan,
the NBN provides wholesale infrastructure that will be sold to Australian ISPs like
Telstra.283
But the NBN construction and roll-out has been difficult. The projected 2007 cost
of $4.7 billion is now estimated to be over $40 billion by the plans 2020 completion.284 By
2013 the NBN had connected roughly 800,000 residents to the new network, expecting
to reach a total of 3.5 million residents by 2015.285 The plan has also been plagued by
ongoing negotiations with ISPs – namely by larger providers seeking better deals than
smaller competitors. A change in government leadership has called into question the
project’s direction and delayed finalizing regulations for the network’s governance.286
While it is yet to be determined to what extent the NBN and its cooperating ISPs
support network neutrality, measures enforcing copyright and online obscenity laws
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online in the country have raised concerns about potential censorship for Australians.287
While these types of laws are not abnormal, increasingly sophisticated technological
tools are available to monitor and prevent undesirable activities online.
The costly NBN rollout has also been politically divisive. While the project was
designed and approved by the country’s center-left Labour part, a change in
government to the leadership of the center-right Coalition party left the project in far
less sympathetic hands.288 Though some Coalition leaders argued the project should be
scrapped altogether, under Minister of Communications Malcolm Turnbull, NBN
construction was continued but with some fiber-to-the-home construction instead
reduced to fiber-to-the-node (or street corner) with copper connections made into
homes.289 This decision, while more affordable in the short run may require more costly
upgrades in the long run.290
Interestingly, recent upheaval in US neutrality policy has drawn attention to the
issue within Australia. In 2010, amid the early development of the NBN, there were
calls, including from Google, for the country to clarify its position on neutrality as the
US government had that year.291 The country has never formalized network neutrality
and instead most ISPs offer explicitly non-neutrality “free zone” content like movie
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downloads from the ISPs partners which don’t count against users’ metered download
limits.292
In the midst of this ongoing investment into fixed broadband, Australia has not
climbed significantly in broadband penetration rankings and in fact, dropped slightly in
global rankings due to faster growth in other countries.293 In 2013, roughly 26 percent of
the population had access to fixed broadband internet – the NBN goal is to connect 93
percent of Australians by 2020.294
3.4.4

New networks, same problems
Despite these ambitious broadband plans in both Australia and New Zealand,

there appears to be little evidence of significant improvement in either’s broadband
speed, access or affordability rankings which remain near the OECD average despite
leading in per-capita investment.295 The lions share of broadband subscriptions in both
countries continue to be DSL connections and both continue to have higher dial-up
subscribership (around 10%) than other OECD countries (where the average is less than
3%.)296
It may be too soon to know the ultimate effects of these long-term plans if they
are allowed to continue. Models in the EU and elsewhere of unbundling appear to be
encouraging, particularly in creating competition among service providers. However, as
Winseck noted in regards to New Zealand, it appears that fast networks alone are no
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substitute for neutrality, particularly when burdensome data caps and existing
content/ISP relationships potentially skew user adoption.297
These examples call into question the claims by network owners in the US that
non-neutral practices may be necessary to fund network expansion. Even as Australia
and New Zealand fund and build new infrastructure, ISPs have continued to
implement data caps and discriminatory policies. As these networks are completed and
expanded and access to ultra-fast fiber networks and increased bandwidth becomes
available, it remains possible that commercial or public interest in network neutrality
will emerge.
As slower DSL and dial-up are traded for fiber to the node or premises
technologies, competing ISPs in Australia and New Zealand may feel pressure either
from consumers or policymakers to offer more open, non-discriminatory service. In
April 2014, at least one small Australian ISP began offering unlimited bandwidth as
part of its fiber connection to the NBN system.298 Until these practices are more widely
adopted, if ISPs are not willing to implement neutral practices despite the growing
presence of ultra-fast fiber networks and heavily subsidized infrastructure, policies that
promote open, equal access to web content should be adopted instead.
3.5

Mixed signals: architecture as problem and solution
The FCC’s network neutrality rulings have generally avoided technical NN

rulings in favor of guiding principles and best practices for internet service providers.
In part, this is because the structure and protocols of the web are often fast-changing
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and the FCC has generally acted reactively, rather than proactively. Most recently, this
slow movement can be seen in the growing attention to internet interconnection and
peering agreements. While some argue these agreements should not be linked to the
classical understanding of NN as regarding the last mile user service, the effects of these
agreements may have a significant role in the issue’s outcome.299
The FCC and regulators elsewhere in the world have generally shied away from
architecture and technology-specific internet regulation. Instead, they have relied on
policies emphasizing “openness” and “transparency” from network owners.300 For
example, the Body for European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC) has
passed and encouraged policies focused on economic relationships rather than
technology specifics by requiring greater network transparency and reinforcing the
unbundling of network owners from ISPs.301
Similarly, rather than technology or network-specific rules, the FCC’s policies
have largely been based on transparency, vague terms regarding non-discrimination
and openness. One the one hand, this can be seen as a move toward principle-based,
rather than rule-based regulation. NN opponents often argue specific rule-based
regulation of internet infrastructure would hamper future development and
innovation.302 However, unclear regulations regarding network architecture have left a
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great deal of flexibility to ISPs and increase the potential for rule-bending and abuse in
the name of QoS.
Political choices, economic opportunism, geography, technological innovation
and sometimes chance have shaped the architecture used today. It has brought together
legacy infrastructure from previous technologies with new innovations of content,
programming and computing. As such, the conscious architecture choices moving
forward should ideally reflect a reconciliation of the needs and desires of both the
network managers and the public who uses and benefits from its existence and
efficiency.
While e2e networking is far from dead, the power of network owners as arbiters
of limited bandwidth space puts them in a particularly strong position for steering the
existing protocols by which the web operates and the physical infrastructure through
which it travels. In the US, this is exacerbated by the control of a handful of centralized
DSL and Cable ISPs creating a bottleneck for users who are particularly susceptible to
coercion, manipulation or abuse. Because of their size, it appears incumbent ISPs have
little or no incentive to invest in infrastructure – some have argued this will only
increase if regulators allow ISPs to increase revenue by content charges such as the
FCC’s proposed “fast lanes.”303 As the largest ISPs increasingly integrate vertically with
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content offerings becoming available online, the danger of discrimination toward
competing content will intensify.304
But the lessons gathered from the cases of Australia and New Zealand suggest
that network neutrality does not naturally evolve from architecture, but is instead
consciously coded and preserved. Although the growth of FTTP investment and
construction by new entrants like independent municipalities and Google as well as
incumbents like AT&T and Verizon may relieve some bandwidth scarcity concerns,
demand for a fast, reliable web will only grow.305 While more utilities, products and
services are moving online, the rapid development of data compression technology to
reduce congestion and buffering may further reduce the congestion of time-sensitive
and data-heavy traffic, but that remains to be seen.306
As long as internet infrastructure is controlled by a relatively small handful of
incredibly powerful gatekeepers, greater capacity should be seen as a substitute for
neutrality policy. While architectural choices are powerful tools for regulating behavior
online, the increasing complexity of global networks offers many opportunities for
intervention. For that reason, other dimensions must be relied upon to help preserve
and maintain network neutrality.
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4

NEUTRALITY AND MARKETS

This chapter examines two very different “market-friendly” approaches to
neutrality regulation and their effects. In the US, direct policy has been traded policies
designed to promote competition between platforms. The EU approach has favored
promoting competition by allowing ISPs to operate across a single platform. Despite
these efforts, there is little evidence that either approach has eliminated the need for
neutrality regulation. Instead, they show the importance of neutrality policies for
ensuring a more equitable competition in the internet ecosystem.
4.1

The promise of competition
While all four modalities have shaped network neutrality, none has received

more attention than the role of markets in encouraging or discouraging online content
discrimination. Terms like competition, monopoly, duopoly, unbundling, and vertical
or horizontal integration have become commonplace in the discussion. During the early
2000s, network owners and ISPs seemed to align with network owners and ISPs against
and content providers and software corporations in favor of NN. In 2014, those lines are
less clear.
The most prominent anti-NN voices (including the majority of telecom operators
themselves) argue: that network neutrality policies are unnecessary because they
conflict with the free market competition among users, content providers and network
providers and/or that existing competition is sufficient to prevent the dangers of nonnet neutrality. Despite these claims, there is little reason to believe current fixed
broadband competition is robust enough to prevent non-discriminatory content
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distribution. This threat of discrimination will only increase as ISPs and networks
increasingly become content providers as well.
Some in the United States have suggested regulators look to European Union
ways to create more broadband competition. Despite EU unbundling policies
encouraging greater market competition, reports of network discrimination and
throttling continue.
4.1.1

Changing markets
As mentioned in previous chapters, the convergence of legacy information

technologies onto a single internet platform and network has driven the network
neutrality conversation.307 While this convergence is the result of new technological
capabilities and capacity, it also marks a seismic shift in the information and
communication technology and media markets. This has coincided with dramatic
deregulation and integration where media organizations have taken advantage of less
strict regulations and lowered cross-ownership barriers.308 While new technology
companies have emerged during this period of rapid convergence and growth, many of
the largest and most influential network owners and content distributers have their
roots in older media like radio, television, and film.309
The beginnings of internet deregulation were spurred in part by the growth of
privately-owned cable distribution networks (upon which some of today’s last-mile
internet communications travel) as well as political and economic trends toward
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deregulation of communication industries in the US beginning in the 1980s.310 This
culminated in the Communications act of 1996, which dramatically loosened the
requirements on media and communications corporations.311 As the telecommunications
and media industry has grown, so has their influence on policymaking and regulatory
oversight, giving the industry powerful influence over the very regulators charged to
oversee it.312 Today, telecommunications corporations are some of the largest campaign
donors in the US and have spent significant funds lobbying against the implementation
of any new network neutrality policies.313
Network neutrality opponents argue that the dangers expressed by neutrality
advocates have yet to materialize, and the instances which have come to light (for
example, Comcast’s 2005 throttling of P2P users) are small exceptions, rather than an
indicator of widespread ISP tactics. Both Yoo and Epstein argue ISP content
discrimination practices should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, letting market
forces and consumer demand control factors like pricing, bandwidth and competition.314
The largest telecom opponents (Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast) have all opposed broad
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calls by the FCC and others for restraint regarding network management, arguing these
rules would be ineffective and potentially harmful to their business practices.315
Not surprisingly, network owners and ISPs have stood in opposition to moves
toward explicit net neutrality policies, citing proposed regulations as burdensome and
potentially harmful to the Internet market. AT&T has warned network neutrality
legislation may potentially reduce competition, compromise efficiency and prohibit
operators from delivering performance-enhancing services.316 Furthermore, in the
company’s 2013 annual report, AT&T claims the removal of the FCC’s 2010 Open
Internet Order would offer new flexibility in managing its networks.317
4.1.2

Making change under pressure
As the FCC currently revising its policies on the matter, the agency is left with

few options and it appears the US internet market is now farther, not closer to network
neutrality policy. While the ruling left the agency authority to regulate, a decade of
legal failures has left few options. One remaining option would be to reclassify internet
traffic under existing “common carrier rules.” The telecom industry generally opposes
any future FCC reclassification efforts that would include utility-style requirements
designed for non-competitive industries. The National Telecommunications and Cable
Association, one of the largest telecom lobbying organizations, argues network
neutrality would “invariably stifle these investments by inserting the federal
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government into the operation of broadband networks and the provision of broadband
services.”318 In a May 2014 testimony before the US House of Representatives, FCC
Chair Tom Wheeler faced questions regarding the agency’s ability to balance the
internet’s market forces with potential regulation moving forward like reclassification.319
Both during the hearing and in a submitted testimony, Wheeler stated the agency
would review all available options for establishing open internet rules, while not ruling
out reclassification measures.320 Moving forward, Wheeler and the FCC are in the
uncomfortable position of crafting rules for all involved parties with few options
remaining.
The ongoing neutrality debate has involved the competing interests of major
online influences including network owners, content producers and the larger online
public. After years of debate there is a need for reconciliation that offers benefits to all
involved in the internet ecosystem.321 However, as the stakes and profits of the internet
economy grow exponentially, the network neutrality debate has become a fight
between the titans of old and new media for control of the web.
4.2

Power over pipes
The internet market in the US (if it can even be described as such) encompasses a

variety of corporations and organizations ranging from those with legacies extending
back over 100 years, to others in their infancy. The existing market conditions have
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resulted in ISPs standing increasingly as gatekeepers to the online world. This uneven
playing field makes NN regulations vital for the future of the web. From a markets
perspective, NN can be seen as a corporate power struggle between established,
incumbent network owners and ISPs like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon with longestablished influence and increasingly powerful and popular content and application
companies like Google, Facebook, and Netflix.322 However, as these large corporations
increasingly integrate both horizontally and vertically, the line between these groups
and the trajectory of the network neutrality debate will continue to shift.
4.2.1

Gatekeepers to the web
The US market positions of ISPs and their respective networks are largely a

product of their non-internet origins and a pattern of media deregulation over the last
30 years. The result is a market dominated by a handful of the largest DSL and Cable
providers with marginal competition from smaller providers. An ongoing series of
mergers and acquisitions has increasingly narrowed the number of ISPs available –
these include the acquisition of TCI’s cable distribution systems by Comcast and the
steady re-unification of the “baby bells” which were separated in the 1980s break-up of
AT&T’s telephone monopoly.323 Because of these acquisitions as well as the presence of
usually just one telephone and cable provider for most cities, the majority of Americans
have few options for broadband service providers – raising the possibility of market
manipulation.324 The size and influence of these ISPs has played a particularly
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significant role in their ability to negotiate content agreements in cable, and increasingly
are used to leverage power online as well.325
The economic considerations of ISPs are complex. They operate as the
intermediaries of a two-sided market in which they negotiate with other networks (and
large content providers) as well as end-users.326 The product they provide – broadband
connections – rely not only on the existing infrastructure, but the ongoing traffic that
travels across it. These organizations argue that in order to keep up with increasing
demand and network expansion they need a variety of tools to both recoup these costs.
This means potentially charging customers and CSPs differently based on how they use
the networks.327 But regulators, network operators and civil society groups have found
little common ground on what amount of pricing and content discrimination should be
considered reasonable for network management.328
The NN conversation has largely focused on the extent to which ISPs should be
allowed to manage or block traffic across the “last mile” of their networks. Given a lack
of service provider competition for US users, ISPs are increasingly the singular
intermediary (and potential gatekeeper) between users and content providers. This
holds potential for abuse.329 Some argue heavy use by a small number of users should be
penalized, since it burdens the network for others, though this has largely been
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addressed through tiered speeds, and limited use of data caps.330 To discourage the
heaviest users, ISPs, including AT&T and Comcast, have incrementally instituted data
caps, which they claim affect only a small percentage of users.331 The FCC’s 2010 Open
Internet Order did not prohibit these measures or speed tiers and usage-based pricing,
however it did prohibit paid prioritization of content.332 Paid prioritization would mean
content providers or applications (or the ISP itself) could pay ISPs to reach customers
faster or more reliably or potentially degrading the quality of other non-paying traffic.
Neutrality opponents and ISPs argue policies like the 2010 Open Internet Order
(and other neutrality measures) are impractical barriers to future internet business
models.333 They say networks and service providers should be allowed to test new
market approaches, pricing models, and network management initiatives, which
neutrality rules prohibit.334 In the wake the 2014 Verizon ruling it is unclear to what
extent any FCC rule revisions will continue to prevent ISPs from creating new forms of
pricing. Until more strict policies are legislated or more drastic neutrality regulations
(such as reclassifying internet service to be under common carrier rules) it is likely
network owners and ISPs will continue to pursue these strategies. Early internet service
was largely held to the same common carrier standards in place for telephone
communications, but in the early 2000s the FCC under the Chairman Michael Powell
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ruled that the networks had common with private cable networks than the
telecommunications networks of the past and thus were not afforded common carriage
protection.335
In light of enormous profit margins of the internet service divisions of ISPs and
network owners, that these calls for pricing and discrimination flexibility have less to
do with network investment, and more to do with growing their profit margins.336 In
fact, the reported revenue of the four largest US broadband providers (AT&T, Verizon,
Comcast and Time Warner Cable) have increased while their spending on capital
expenditures like network upgrades has largely remained steady (see Figure 3.) – all
while the number of broadband users has increased.337
In other words, broadband providers are making more money and serving more
customers without spending more on networks. While networks claim the network
neutrality rules discourage investment, the reduction in capital expenditures from these
providers began long before the 2010 Open Internet Order and has not seen a marked
reduction since the rules were instituted.338
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Reported Revenue vs. CAPEX (in millions)
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Feld argues processes like broadband pricing tiers and “premium service” add
little value to the network itself while users pay ISPs higher prices or risk slower
access.339 With ISP average revenue per user margins dwarfing those of CSPs (In 2013,
Google profited $11 per user, while Comcast made $323), it makes little sense for
content companies to subsidize infrastructure construction and in fact, ISPs would be
incredibly averse to slowing any content if markets were reasonably competitive.340 The
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corporations who own increasingly large swaths of internet infrastructure may have
great incentives to take advantage of their powerful position. Wu notes: “it doesn’t take
a genius to realize that if AT&T and the cable companies exercised broad discretion to
speed up the business of some firms and slow down that of others, they would gain the
power of life and death over the Internet.”341 Network neutrality is a necessary tool for
fighting the outsized market power of US network providers. That need for neutrality is
particularly clear when examining how ISPs have used their position when dealing
with online content providers.
4.3

Content held captive
In the past 20 years there has also been an explosion of content and applications

needing more bandwidth and faster download and upload speeds across the network.
Simple landing pages with a minimum number of images have been replaced by
streaming video, streaming audio, complex interactive applications and online
ecosystems that demand greater resources and nearly instantaneous transmission to
function.342 This shift has led to a change in behavior online from users visiting a large
number of unique webpages to the majority of web traffic passing through a handful of
the most popular search engines, entertainment sites, and social networks.343 This
growing and influential segment of the internet market relies on fast, ubiquitous
broadband connections to exist and until recently content providers have taken a
substantial role in promoting network neutrality.
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Content providers online range dramatically in scale from the individual owner
of small, seldom-visited website to multi-billion dollar online media corporations like
Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Netflix, and Apple. The actual content provided
is as often as diverse as the web itself. Whether professionally produced or user created,
a large portion of today’s internet content requires speedy, seamless broadband
connectivity.344 In July 2014, a list of the most popular websites globally were dominated
by search engines (led by Google), social networks (led by Facebook) and video
streaming websites (led by YouTube.)345
While these website and applications are popular, they rely on broadband
networks to access users, content, and revenue. The institution of neutrality policies by
the FCC are in part a response to anti-competitive actions by ISPs who have exploited
their role in the internet market to help or hurt content online. The sheer scale of
internet providers that have been allowed to merge and grow in the de-regulated US
media market has intensified this. In particular, network providers have focused on
three types of internet traffic: peer-to-peer file sharing, Voice over IP (VoIP), and video
streaming.346
While a wide variety of internet content is available legally, like YouTube,
Netflix, Spotify and Hulu, the decentralized and unlimited duplication of media online
has undermined a previously significant source of revenue for media companies. This
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has drawn the attention of the media companies and regulators.347 A community of
online users illegally sharing digital versions of these media through a variety of
simple, largely-anonymous tools including peer-to-peer sharing, linking websites and
cyber lockers.348 This has drawn the attention of both media corporations and
regulators. In 2005, Comcast was fined by the FCC for repeatedly slowing the traffic of
peer-to-peer users on the suspicion that those users were illegally sharing files – a clear
violation of network neutrality principles.349 In addition to ISPs have also taken actions
to discriminate against online content that competes with legacy technologies.
VoIP offers a similar service to audio telephone communication, but uses IP
protocols to translate and transmit these voice messages over the internet rather than a
separate network. These services require faster, more reliable service than websites, and
are thus also more sensitive to traffic management by ISPs.350 Because many DSL and
cable broadband providers also offer voice services, there is an incentive for them to
slow or block competing VoIP services to their customers.351 However, VoIP also creates
competition new with the existing phone serve many network providers already offer.
In 2004, the FCC opened an investigation against Madison River Communications that
blocked Vonage’s VoIP service to its customers.352 Madison River argued it blocked the
sites based on network management needs, however the presence of a competing
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service being sold by the company appeared to show a conflict of interest.353 After some
investigation, Madison River agreed to stop blocking VoIP services and offered a
voluntary payment in exchange for the case being dropped.354
While the FCC has made high-profile investigations of blocking against VoIP
providers, in many other places in the world slowing and blocking of these services is
not uncommon, though regulators usually argue this based on network strain, rather
than market competition. For example, as recently as 2009 South Korea restricted VoIP
services except those offered by the preferred South Korean carrier.355 The Netherlands,
one of the first countries to codify strong, formal network neutrality laws, considers
VoIP and some streaming video differently from less data-intensive Internet traffic.356
Video traffic is also regarded differently from other web services, though the
threat of video content discrimination is increasingly seen as a market competition,
rather than a technical matter. In part, this is the result of the slow shift of video services
from traditional television technologies like over-the-air and cable to streaming online.
As the technological capacity for streaming video has improved, so have video content
producers increasingly shifted content online.357 Recently, media institutions from
around the world have scrambled to capture the interest and eyes of online viewers.358
These include traditional media producers and television studios as well as new tech
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companies seeking to compete with these legacy producers for the new online
territory.359 While this video programming exists on the new internet platform, the tools
for financing these endeavors uses many of the same strategies as previous forms of
media including relying on: single purchases, (iTunes and Amazon), advertising
(YouTube), subscriptions (Netflix and Amazon Prime), or a combination of the three
(Hulu.)360
The rise of “cord cutters” (consumers replacing cable television service with
online video streaming) has raised the interest of cable providers. In response to this,
vertically integrated ISPs who also provide cable video services, have a strong incentive
to block or slow competing video traffic or offer faster select content as part of their
cable services.361 However, network neutrality rules have generally stood in the way of
this. In a 2014 interview, Former FCC chairman and current president of the National
Cable and Telecommunications Association, Michael Powell denied this, arguing only a
small percentage of consumers are technically “cord cutters.”362 Yet despite these claims,
the rise of a handful of new competitors into the video market has drawn the attention
of the cable industry and intensified the neutrality debate. Video providers like
Comcast have invested heavily in streaming video services like the company’s TV
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Everywhere service that allows cable customers to stream television programming
online as part of cable subscriptions.363
One online video service, Netflix, has been particularly vocal about the need for
network neutrality to preserve online video streaming. Netflix, which originally
provided subscription DVD rentals by mail before shifting to offering subscription
online video streaming, has grown to being responsible for a large portion of peak
internet traffic in the US.364 In the wake of the 2014 Verizon decision, some speculated
that cable companies and ISPs may take the opportunity to throttle Netflix content in
exchange for payment or carriage agreements.365 However, in Netflix’s January 2014
letter to investors, the company argued its popularity with consumers would likely
prevent any overt blocking or throttling.366 This appeared to only be partially true.
4.3.1

Backdoor deals to defeat neutrality
With the 2014 NN debate and FCC rule revision in the background, Netflix

participated in a number of high-profile negotiations and disputes with ISPs including
Comcast and Verizon over interconnection agreements.367 Ultimately, Netflix reached
agreements with these ISPs; but it remains unclear to what degree the NN debate
served as a bargaining chip for Netflix in the negotiations or whether the
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interconnection debate is a proxy war for the larger discussion about balancing CSP and
ISP power. Following this public disagreement, the FCC has vowed to examine
interconnection more closely, which may affect future neutrality regulation.
Nonetheless, the debate raised scrutiny about the otherwise complex and under
examined role of interconnection and peering in the internet debate and their
implications on the larger internet market.368
Increasingly content agreements and interconnection deals are used by ISPs as a
way to circumvent neutrality rules. Beginning in 2012, Comcast allowed the streaming
of video through the company’s Xfinity On Demand service over Xbox to not count
against user data caps, while other services like Netflix and HBO Go continued to
count.369 Comcast has argued this discrimination is acceptable because its CDN
agreement with Microsoft means this streaming is not happening over the internet (and
subject to NN) but instead is merely an exchange between Comcast’s own servers and
its users.370
The largest CSPs may be able to afford to negotiate cable-like carriage fees with
ISPs and network owners, small and mid-size companies would potentially be at a clear
disadvantage.371 For this reason, the largest companies may not be eager to enter the
network neutrality debates. Crawford argues these major internet companies actually
have strong leverage against internet providers – just as the most popular cable
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television channels (like ESPN) have strong leverage over cable companies.372 She
argues “Facebook and Google are powerful enough that the providers need them more
than they need the cable guys. So they know they’ll be able to make all the deals they
want. They’re not so worried about the fate of the next Google, or the next Facebook.”373
As Google has grown, so has its role in the network neutrality debate. In 2005,
Vinton Cerf, one of the developers of TCP/IP, a Google Vice president and the
company’s “Chief Internet Evangelist” testified to the US House of Representatives on
the benefits of network neutrality and the merits of non-discrimination.374 In 2006, he
again argued on Google’s behalf to congress that the openness of the internet has led to
its success and growth. Yet in 2010, the company’s position appeared to budge – it
announced a policy proposal agreement with Verizon that recommended neutrality on
existing platforms, but opened the potential for new pricing approaches to “new
technologies.”375 While Google has signed a petition supporting FCC action in
supporting network neutrality, the company has maintained a lower visibility in the
2014 debate than in previous years.376 In part, this may be a result of Google’s own
increasing investment in internet infrastructure through Google Fiber and it’s
investment in the wireless Android smartphone market.377
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The combination of content and infrastructure is particularly salient both as a
tool for maximizing distribution as well as controlling the possibility of losses through
illegal file sharing and copyright infringement. Neutrality policies balance the power
between ISPs and content providers by offering relatively equal footing for emerging
companies who otherwise would have little leverage to gain access to networks.378 Some
have suggested that without neutrality rules, emerging online services like cloud
storage and computing – which require nearly instantaneous access to servers over the
web -- could become prohibitively expensive without some expectation of fair pricing
and treatment.379 While pricing freedom and content discrimination may offer network
owners and operators profits and possibly revenue for network investment, Van
Schewick argues the potential market damage to innovation and applications online
would be costly to society.380
4.3.2

Size matters: vertical integration and neutrality
In many ways, the increasing vertical integration between ISPs and CSPs may be

one of the gravest threats to the current status of network neutrality. As networks
integrate internally-produced or owned content into their services, existing CSPs
become direct competitors. The following is a hypothetical nightmare scenario for
unrestricted vertical integration with no network neutrality: “ISP X” is the sole cable ISP
in a city and offers a streaming video service (ISP X Video) that competes with “CSP Z.”
Without some form of net neutrality expectation, ISP X could charge its customers an added fee

378 	
  Samuels,	
  “What’s	
  Next	
  for	
  Net	
  Neutrality?:	
  Don’t	
  Harm	
  the	
  Start-‐Up	
  Economy.”	
  
379 	
  Froehlich,	
  “Net	
  Neutrality	
  Retreat	
  Threatens	
  Cloud	
  Growth.”	
  

380 	
  Van	
  Schewick,	
  Towards	
  an	
  Economic	
  Framework	
  for	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Regulation,	
  390.	
  

109

to access CSP Z while offering “ISP X Video” for free. Without ISP competition, users would
have little or no access to CSP Z’s content without paying more. ISP X could also potentially
negotiate fees to make CSP Z’s content available to ISP X users for free again. In this scenario,
the ISP becomes the ultimate arbiter of what content its users can access and has an
incentive to only offer the content that will bring in the most profits.
For now, it appears policies, rather than the market has discouraged the worst of
these potential scenarios, but in the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling, the potential for
this level of ISP intervention remains far from impossible. But despite the potential for
the largest ISPs and vertically-integrated media corporations to exploit their market
position, these organizations have seen a mixed track record – the failed merger of AOL
and Time Warner being a prime example. Grove and Baumann argue corporations
attempting to integrate content and infrastructure have underperformed.381 They argue
this is partially because the business models and technical needs of each of these
businesses are dramatically different – causing slow, and troubled integration
processes, but potential for long-term success.382 The investors and owners of these
organizations are leery of expensive, long-term investments with unreliable payoff –
they argue the threat of an internet dominated by vertically-integrated corporations
(with some exceptions) remains generally remote.383
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However, the 2011 union between Comcast and NBC Universal has already
proved to be more successful than the AOL-Time Warner predecessor.384 The newlyacquired content from NBC-Universal gave Comcast a powerful bargaining chips when
negotiating with both television programming companies and distribution networks.385
In other words, because of Comcast’s vast cable infrastructure – it could negotiate
favorable agreements with programming companies; because of its valuable
programming (NBC and its affiliates) it could secure lower fees from competing cable
providers.
In fact, it is this cable-style negotiating tactics that NN proponents fear.386
Applied to the internet, cable-style negotiating would mean ISPs may charge CSPs
carriage fees based on their popularity. Alternatively, ISPs may institute data caps, but
allow some content providers to not count against these caps, provided they’ve
negotiated an agreement with the ISPs – a practice increasingly common on non-neutral
wireless networks.387 While this may set a dangerous precedent on wireless networks,
they are far more competitive than wireline broadband – where there is far less
competition between ISPs.388
In 2014, Comcast offered to buy Time Warner Cable (the cable provider/ISP was
spun-off from AOL Time Warner) and its millions of subscribers would potentially only
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increase the company’s power to negotiate with content providers (and users) - if not
through non-neutral pricing, then through largely under-regulated interconnection,
peering and CDN agreements.389 Time will tell whether regulators allow the largest and
second-largest cable broadband networks become a single super-provider. The merger
would only further reduce the number of US broadband providers and perhaps more
significantly increase Comcast’s already immense market leverage against content
providers. With the power imbalances between networks and content providers only
become greater, network neutrality and non-discrimination rules in the US should be
seen as preserving market competition rather than inhibiting it.
4.4

Neutrality in the European Union
Both the US and the EU have wrestled with appropriate tools for addressing

online competition, yet the two have approached the issue very differently.390 In part,
this is because each have different histories, political/cultural climates and governance
structures. Rather than passing explicit continent-wide network neutrality rules,
European regulators have instead opted for a series of regulatory measures focused on
promoting broadband transparency and competition rather than explicit policy
prohibitions.
While European homes only have access to single fixed telecommunication
network, competition access to infrastructure through local loop unbundling (LLU) has
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created opportunities for broadband competition.391 In contrast, U.S. households often
have internet access through both cable and telephone providers, but operate within a
largely duopolistic market. Because of these differences, the reinforcement and
maintenance of this unbundling has taken priority over more specific regulations on
networks and ISPs.
4.4.1

Crafting neutrality through markets?
The European Commission, the executive and law-proposing body of the

European Union, Internet regulations have attempted to balance defending public
access rights, preserving European culture and promoting European content creators.392
Beginning with a framework in 2002, EU legislators took steps were to promote nondiscriminatory actions by ISPs and general Internet quality of service. Since then
attempts have been made to balance increased QoS standards for applications without
further burdening ISPs and also working with existing national regulatory policies.393
The 2002 directive asked that member nations follow a series of steps to analyze current
practices and encourage broadband providers in each step to take steps increasing
competition and transparency based on each country’s specific conditions.394 The 2002
EU policy relied almost exclusively on market competition measures rather than
explicitly network neutrality rules.395
In 2011, the European Commission reexamined the issues surrounding open

391 	
  Marcus	
  et	
  al.,	
  “Network	
  Neutrality.”	
  
392 	
  Marsden,	
  Net	
  Neutrality.	
  
393 	
  Ibid.	
  

394 	
  Carter	
  et	
  al.,	
  “A	
  Comparison	
  of	
  Network	
  Neutrality	
  Approaches	
  in.”	
  
395 	
  Ibid.,	
  21–22.	
  

113

internet and Net Neutrality in further depth. The subsequent report emphasized the
EU’s need for “more stringent measures to achieve competition and the choice
consumers deserve.”396 The Commission pledged to address strains on existing
networks by working with EU member states and stakeholders to encourage the
development of broadband to relieve bandwidth pressure.397
Much of the information informing the European Commission’s policies on
Internet access, traffic and speeds has been gathered by the Body of European
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), a board composed of the heads of
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) that monitor communication markets, services
and networks.398 Past recommendations on net neutrality from BEREC have drawn
attention from organizations such as the Internet Society, which praised the board’s
October 2011 recommendations for clear definitions of Internet service, transparency in
monitoring connection speeds, bandwidth, and access.399
A 2012 BEREC report indicating the status of Internet practices and restrictions in
Europe showed nearly one in five EU broadband users was subject to some form of
network neutrality violations.400 In response, the organization suggested more
competition should be the main tool for disciplining ISPs with user transparency a must
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for maintaining fair competition.401 That report also noted existing regulatory tools (like
clear rules regarding acceptable QoS measures) should be adequate for addressing net
neutrality concerns unresolved by market forces. Marcus, Nooren, Cave, and Carter
recommend the EU maintain existing NN regulations which upheld existing QoS rules
while monitoring for neutrality complaints, usually the throttling of p2p and VoIP
users.402 Despite these basic network neutrality framework and subsequent statements
supporting neutrality in the region, the EU continues to defer to market self-regulation
or jurisdiction of member country NRAs and legislation.
While unbundling is more common in the EU, the level of scrutiny placed on
European telecom corporations depends on the whims of the European Commissioners
and European Parliament, however in the wake of the 2014 US setbacks, neutrality
proposals in Europe appear to be reinvigorated.403 A more robust set of regulations in
Europe called “ConnectedContinent” has been slowly introduced and moved through
the EU governmental system.404 After five years of development, the EU Parliament
passed a version of the network neutrality bill in April 2014 after several rounds of
debate which removed a provision for allowing “specialized services” and establishing
stronger NN rules for both wireline and wireless networks including “a clear and
binding definition of Net Neutrality and prohibitions against blocking, throttling and
other forms of discrimination from Internet service providers.”405 Since then, the bill has
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faced much strong opposition from European telecommunications companies, members
of the European Commission and member states and may be delayed until as late as
2016.406
4.4.2

Making rules for a diverse region
Attempts to manipulate markets to create a more neutral internet through

unbundling have been somewhat effective, but structural measures elsewhere have also
created similar results. For example, the equal distribution of high-speed cable and fiber
optic Internet technology in South Korea appears to discourage content discrimination;
in Germany, a market dominated by the single provider Deutsche Telekom,
government attempts at decoupling have been attempted, but have largely been
unsuccessful, leading to repeated attempts at creating alternate policies to ensure
network neutrality compliance from the country.407
However, in the decade since the EU’s light-handed competition and
unbundling-based approach have been adopted, the overall effects of fostering a
neutrality climate are unclear. Broadband adoption in the EU continues to grow, though
that growth appears vary widely from country to country. Since 2004, fixed broadband
penetration in the EU has grown from around 4% to nearly 25% yet only 5% of the
population has access to fast-broadband (over 30 Mbps.) and many of those are located
in a handful of countries.408 The majority of EU broadband customers continue to
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connect via DSL through copper phone lines, though in some places like Romania and
Belgium over 50% of subscriptions are for ultra-high speed fiber connections.409
Despite competition and transparency rules, accusations of heavy-handed
network management techniques by ISPs persist.410 Because of this and a political
movement to develop a clearer region-wide broadband development climate and
policies, support has grown for more explicitly neutrality policies.411 If passed, measures
such as those proposed by the European Parliament in 2014 may more clearly align the
various member state policies ranging from explicit rules to industry self-regulation.412
Member-state policies regarding neutrality range from the strong support like
the Netherlands, to some echoing the official EU position, and five smaller members
that had taken no clear position on the issue.413 While many EU countries including
France and Sweden have taken steps toward supporting network neutrality, in 2012 the
Netherlands became the first European country to adopt its own formal laws banning
the blocking or levying of additional fees for the use of Internet communication services
by mobile telephone operators.414 For some European countries, passing neutrality laws
internally may be politically easier and faster than waiting for continent-wide
regulations.
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4.5

Different approaches, different results
In the most basic sense, the unbundling approach adopted in much of the EU is

designed to foster market competition by offering multiple service providers to
compete across a single infrastructure. In comparison, the US approach allows multiple
different technologies to be constructed and compete with each other for users. In both
approaches, policy is used to cultivate different market approaches.
The effects of the different approaches on the larger internet markets are unclear
– each afford different benefits and consequences for both the US and EU. For example,
since 2007 annual infrastructure spending per-household in the US is nearly double that
of the EU, raising the possibility that the unbundling approach discourages
investment.415 However, the cost of high-speed internet service (30 Mbps+) is also
generally lower in the EU than that of the US.416 Not only that, but according to the ITU,
nine of the top 10 countries with the highest broadband penetration are within the
EU.417
The range of speeds, investment and fixed broadband technologies vary greatly
between EU member nations and the EU average is not particularly informative for
comparison.418 The telecommunications markets in Europe countries (many of which
have recently-deregulated national telecom monopolies) often resemble each other
more than the US system.419 While the effects of these two approaches can be compared,
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there are some limitations to what they tell us. In part, this is because the multi-state
composition of the EU offers a huge range of business climates and populations
compared to the US.
While ISP competition may be viable in many European countries where a
centralized infrastructure allows for easier service unbundling, the size and influence of
telecommunications corporations, the wide variety of different infrastructures, and the
lack of interest by regulators and legislators in major overhauls means the chances of
similar unbundling in the US is unlikely.
4.5.1

The dream of a market solution
The economic implications of network neutrality have made it a popular subject

for analysis, but much of the impact relies on speculation and projections about the
impact of future neutrality regulations. Generally, some flexibility for pricing, network
management, caps and tiered service are accepted in the internet economy; however
more dramatic requirements on pricing, content discrimination or the reclassification of
internet communication as common carriers may lead to unexpected results.420
Although they argue their role is maintaining competition between companies
online, US regulators like the FCC, FTC, and Justice department have recently avoided
dramatic interventions.421 Under the banner of competition and openness, the FCC
policy has nominally supported the issue with a handful of “open internet” orders, but
offered relatively few consequences if they were violated.422 Recently, the FCC’s most
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powerful tool for maintaining NN has been through its oversight role over the mergers
of media companies.423 As an arbiter of the “public interest,” the commission has
secured temporary non-discrimination agreements as stipulations for several corporate
mergers including AT&T. A three-year commitment to preserving network neutrality
on AT&T’s networks was one of the final conditions required by the FCC before the
company’s merger with former “baby bell” Bellsouth.424 Likewise, Comcast’s merger
with NBC-Universal was approved pending a multi-year neutrality commitment.425
Recently, two announced mega-mergers between Comcast-Time Warner Cable and
AT&T-DirectTV – if approved, are expected to include ongoing network neutrality and
transparency requirements.426
As the FCC reassesses its approach to the issue following the 2014 Verizon
ruling, the European approach to fostering neutrality through market competition
offers key lessons for US policy moving forward. In particular, the movement to create
more explicit network neutrality policies in Europe, despite existing transparency and
competition measures may be a sign of the limitations of market-based competition to
reach an ideal level of non-discrimination protection.
Comparisons between the US and EU have not been uncommon. Notably,
during the last FCC net neutrality rulemaking process, a series of academics published
an op-ed in The New York Times suggesting regulators mirror the EU approach of
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increased transparency. They claimed:
Before the commission embraces regulation, it should take another look at the
European model and focus on a policy built on transparency. […]Under the new
European rules, providers are required to inform customers of any limitations
that they impose on access, or on the use of services and applications, including
bandwidth caps. […]This represents a vote of deserved confidence regarding the
effectiveness of Europe’s current competition policy as well as the evolution of
pricing, competition and investment in the industry. Europe already has all the
tools needed to address lapses in competition if they occur.427
Similar calls for transparency are in many ways the most market-friendly and
politically-feasible approaches for addressing content discrimination by ISPs, but as the
EU shows, they have had limited success and may be abused.428 They often rest on the
theory that a more transparent, informed marketplace will more informed and efficient
decisions, but this becomes complicated as the limitations of visibility (regarding
sometimes incredibly technical information) and provides few solutions in markets
with little or no competition.429 Complex interconnection and peering agreements are
playing an increasingly significant role in how online content flows, and while they
have not traditionally been a part of network neutrality regulations, increased
transparency in regards to how these agreements are brokered and executed could
potentially preempt the need for ex post regulation.
Neutrality advocates have called for greater transparency requirements,
particularly for those demanding greater details regarding ISP interactions and
interconnections. While the transparency aspects of the FCC’s Open Internet Order
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were not dismissed in the Verizon ruling, the information reported to the commission is
fairly limited and could be expanded to include more detailed reporting on
interconnection agreements, ongoing speeds reports, and more detailed reporting on
the speeds customers encounter.430
4.5.2

When markets don’t lead
While US network operators hold particularly strong positions and near-

monopoly power, they still compete to some degree with both traditional and emerging
technologies. Their influence will only increase without some form of network
neutrality policy to enforce equitable market relationships online. However, the
tenuous balance between online content providers and network owners is threatened as
the largest CSPs also have the ability to protect themselves from future competition by
working with those who provide the pipes.
There appears to be little momentum in the US towards Euro-style unbundling
that would allow ISPs open access to compete for access to users. Instead, entrenched
network owner/operators operate with little or no competition and little incentive to
invest in faster infrastructure, despite huge profits. In a climate of little or no broadband
competition, network neutrality rules attempt to establish some level of reasonable
competition by competition by limiting the ability for ISPs to exploit their market
position through content and price discrimination. While the FCC’s 2010 attempt to
maintain competition through neutrality has been dismissed, the Verizon ruling did
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leave the possibility of drastic regulatory action: reclassification of internet service as a
utility.431
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5

NEUTRALITY AND NORMS

The following chapter discusses the normative aspects of network neutrality. In
particular, the following three cases show how community consensus or lack thereof
may prevent the wider adoption of neutrality norms. First, it examines how the long
legacy of common carriage has influenced network neutrality norms even beyond the
removal of common carriage rules from internet service. Next, the chapter highlights
the emergence and resonance of the values of openness and independence associated
with the internet and how divisions between those values may affect the adoption of
neutrality norms to a wider community online. Finally, it highlights how divisions
within international governance meetings and the proposal and supporting of network
neutral or non-neutral principles reveal the challenges facing the potential adoption of
wider network neutrality norms.
5.1

The end of the internet?
The provocative headline “We’re About to Lose Net Neutrality — And the

Internet as We Know It,” in the magazine Wired claimed a 2013 challenge to the FCC’s
2010 Open Internet Order would end content non-discrimination online in the US and
by extension, drastically alter the internet.432 Only a few months later, the 2014 Verizon
case was decided and key parts of the order were struck down. Even though the FCC’s
regulatory protection against content discrimination has been removed, the
expectations by many of how content should be available online remains.
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Network neutrality is tied to a blend of “technical, economic and civic
meanings.”433 For some, the subject represents the threat of heavy-handed government
regulation, while for others it is the path for cultivating a more open, democratic web.
While norms supporting network neutrality may have helped shape current policy and
markets, but without unified support from the larger public, those norms have proved
no match compared to other forms of regulation.
5.1.1

Why haven’t norms saved the net?
Lessig argues norms established through subjective and objective terminology,

shapes the social understanding of an issue and how it is and will be regulated.434 He
notes, “Norms constrain an individual’s behavior, but not through the centralized
enforcement of a state. If they constrain, they constrain because of the enforcement of a
community. In the case of the internet, that community could potentially include
billions.
The decentralized and open nature of the internet makes identifying its
underlying norms difficult if not impossible to identify. Instead, the internet is
comprised of many networks and communities with many varying expectations and
norms. Identifying the norms of network neutrality are also challenging, though many
can be traced to the concept’s roots in common carriage. Despite the fact that much of
discussion and advocacy surrounding network neutrality is driven by emotionality and
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appeals to these normative values, much of the academic analysis has focused on its
legal and policy measures or the market interactions between ISPs and CSPs.435
Unlike the mechanisms of other modalities, norms rely on community for
enforcement. As this chapter shows, the fragmented nature of the internet as a
community has repeatedly been no match for more concentrated regulatory powers of
markets, policies and architecture. In each of the following three cases, norms have
played a significant role in the expectations and shaping of the network neutrality
conversation, but have also failed to translate normative support to continuous
behavior.
In the case of common carriage, ancient norms of transportation and public use
were removed from internet connections during a powerful trend of media
concentration and deregulation. But despite this change, the common carriage norms
underlying network neutrality have played a role in how NN continues to be
addressed. Likewise, divided community norms of internet independence and
openness have led to fragmented approaches to how those values should be preserved,
thus weakening support for network neutrality policies. Finally, while international
internet governance organizations have worked to assemble and establish norms of
internet freedom and openness, these organizations have failed to establish or support
explicit neutrality standards. In all three cases, community divisions have stood in the
way of neutrality norms, thus allowing great influence from the other regulatory
dimensions.
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5.2

Common carriage as a norm
While the term NN is a relatively new term, it follows a legacy of underlying

principles supporting fair and open access to communication networks as well as
content-neutral delivery of information with a history extending far into the past.436
Common carriage has changed significantly over time. Noam argues that while
common carriage is deeply associated with utilities and monopolies, it is not inherently
linked to those concepts:
Precursors to common carriage go back to the Roman Empire and the legal
obligations of shipowners, innkeepers and stable keepers.4 In England early
common law placed certain duties on businesses which were considered ‘public
callings’. Common or public occupations included those of bakers, brewers, cab
drivers, ferrymen, innkeepers, millers, smiths, surgeons, tailors and wharfingers.’
‘Common’ in that context meant ‘open to serving the general public’ or
‘general’.437
With the rise of capitalistic trade and economics, common carriage become more
explicitly associated with transportation networks, but its ties to public service,
particularly in its obligation to serve the public as a necessary passage for information
without unnecessary discrimination continues today. As technologies changed, these
laws naturally evolved to include railroads and forms of transportation before
ultimately being applied to communications networks.
Christian Sandvig notes that political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool proposed
expanding common carriage rules to new communication technologies, at a time when
the internet was in its infancy.438 In his 1983 book Technologies of Freedom de Sola Pool
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addresses this almost explicitly saying, “when resource constraints are severe and
circumstances fit the historical situation of a common carrier, then norms exist.”439
Those norms guide how that media form should be treated. He then outlines a series of
policies to enshrine freedom in communication systems such as non-discrimination,
prohibitions on monopoly abuse and minimally burdensome regulations.440 While de
Sola Pool’s suggestions are policy solutions, they reflect a conscious observation of the
normative expectations given to communication technologies. Just as they applied to
the cable and telephone technologies primarily discussed in Technologies of Freedom,
those same norms apply to the internet today.
The last common carrier obligations were removed from internet connections in
2002 by the FCC under Chairman Michael Powell. Despite a lack of formal rules, the
public backlash against ISPs who discriminatory filtering and throttling indicated some
community expectations of nondiscrimination for internet content remained.441
Following these incidents and the election of an administration more sympathetic to
these causes, the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order sought to preserve the norms of
network neutrality through oversight regulation, rather than explicit legislation. The
failed 2010 Open Internet Order can be understood as an attempt to preserve the norm
of network neutrality despite strong industry pressure and with the support of only a
fraction of the larger internet community.
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The Verizon ruling showed that this attempt to codify the norms of neutrality
without revisiting existing common carriage policies was an untenable position.442
Crawford argues the FCC’s Verizon court loss is no surprise since the FCC “claimed,
somehow, that it both repudiated the need for ‘common carriage’ rules and, at the same
time, had the power to prevent discrimination by service providers” by using its power
to reclassify broadband back to common carrier status.443
In the public eye, the distinctions between “network neutrality,” “open internet,”
and “common carriage,” continue to blur. Terms like “Open Internet” and “Network
Neutrality” have become substitutes for talking about the principles outlined in
common carrier rules.444 Many supporters endorse the normative features of common
carriage being applied to broadband, regardless of whether or not the specific legal and
market implications of legal reclassification may be difficult or even impossible to
enforce.445
The convergence of legacy media to a single internet platform has complicated
these distinctions for network providers as well. For example, despite fiercely opposing
to applying common carrier privileges for broadband, in 2014 Verizon reportedly took
advantage of Title II common carrier privileges such as claiming utility right-of-way for
constructing its fiber connections.446 The company then used those same fiber
connections for its FTTP FiOS internet service. This action is technically legal, because
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the company’s phone service travels through the same fiber as its broadband. Examples
like these challenge both the practical and legal distinctions between these different
technologies.
5.2.1

Revisiting common carriage today
The effects of reclassifying internet service as a common carrier are unknown

and may depend on whether it is applied in principle or by the letter of the law.
Skeptics have warned that internet data is far different from the telephone data Title II
in the 1996 law was designed to regulate, and therefore it may be counterproductive if
not altogether technologically impossible to regulate them using the same rules.447
Despite these claims, the common carriage rules neutrality advocates seek have less to
do with the technical and legal description, than the original principles of fair,
reasonable and uninterrupted treatment of access to a public resource. As can be seen in
the next section, that expectation has been driven in part by the norms independence
and openness coded into the early internet, but mobilizing those norms in support of
neutrality has proved to be quite difficult.
5.3

Norming the net
In part, the norms associated with the internet are not inherent to its

construction, but instead grew with it. But even though neutrality advocates have
worked to connect NN to values associated with the internet’s success, fragmentation
within the larger internet using community over how those norms should be preserved
has left the issue more susceptible to influence from political and economic powers.
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These internet norms include concepts like decentralization, communitarianism,
collaboration, transparency and open access.448 Castells suggests the early producers
and users of internet technology have intentionally embedded these values and beliefs
ingrained in the internet.449 He argues that the characteristics of several early internet
groups including hackers, elites, communitarians and entrepreneurs who have
ingrained in internet culture tendencies toward independence, decentralization, and
collaboration.450
While these norms have been long included in discussion about internet culture,
they have also been mobilized in defense neutrality. Examining some of the values
embedded within discussions of the internet offer a deeper perspective for
understanding the role of norms in the network neutrality debate.451 McKelvey argues
network neutrality further protect the values of the “open internet:”
In actuality, a network neutrality principle makes a political stand by preserving
the generative, perhaps radical democratic, aspects of the Internet. Participatory
culture, social media, citizen journalism, and the creative commons depend on
users being able to upload, broadcast, and share freely. Peers are the productive
ends of the network.452
Conversely, neutrality advocates have used the values associated with the
internet as a tool for popularizing the concept. Kimball observes that the principles
behind NN gained more support when connected to the rhetoric of “internet freedom”
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and “open internet” initiatives compared the more technical and confusing “network
neutrality.”453
5.3.1

An open web
Open internet advocates say the web is a powerful democratizing, and

community-building force and non-discrimination is an important aspect of preserving
widespread access. The Internet has been described as the world’s largest public
commons.454 The web is depicted as a place where online producers who create content
are also often the users who consume it.455 Non-discrimination standards like NN
preserve the values of free speech and public discussion online.456 Because of the
internet’s growing role as a vital information conduit, Nunziato argues broadband
providers increasingly should follow the normative standard (if not yet legal
compulsion) to serve as an unfiltered conduit for communication and to avoid
prioritizing or discriminating against any legal forms of speech.457 Guaranteeing unfiltered access preserves of the internet’s role as a valuable public forum:
As a conduit for information in this public forum for expression, broadband
providers should be prohibited from engaging in bias and allowing dominant
content or application providers to lock in their dominant positions and lock out
disfavored content or applications.458
Senator Al Franken of Minnesota, one of the most vocal supports of network
neutrality in the US congress, argued the maintaining network neutrality “ is absolutely
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the First Amendment issue of our time.”459 Without content non-discrimination,
journalism online (increasingly the dominant place for news consumption) may become
cost prohibitive or subject to censorship from network operators. 460 Turilli, Vaccaro and
Taddeo argue NN supporters have had success in framing neutrality as an ethical
necessity for preserving access and fairness online.461 They argue network neutrality
position stems from a desire to enforce fairness across the Internet.
Fairness and access online may only be possible if trust and transparency are
created between users and network operators. In a 2008 interview, open source
software pioneer, Richard Stallman said he had no opposition to minor network
management measures, but objected to ISP privileging some sites over others, which he
described as “dishonest.”462 Benkler echoes this sentiment, suggesting the combination
of transparent interactions and participation has helped make the web a revolutionary
space for cultural production.463
Collaboration and cooperation has become a hallmark characteristic of the “open
internet” as well. As a vocal supporter of open access and the benefits of collaborative
networks, Benkler has emphasized the value of norms and practices like open access,
peer production and collaborative innovation.464 Expectations of open access to the web
and collaborative technologies are in part a vestige of the free, openly-available
protocols and systems like TCP/IP and WWW upon which much of the internet has
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been built.465 The availability of these technologies allowed for the creation of a larger,
unified web. Marsden argues neutrality preserves that ability to expand the community
of the web:
The open Internet is a commons for all to enjoy. That is the basis for claims that it
should be preserved and regulation induced to prevent any more enclosure of
that commons, while at the same time ensuring that the commons is not ruined
by free-riders – that there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’. The open Internet is by
no means the only or necessarily the most important place for public opinion to
be formed, but it is the open public space that gives legitimacy to all these private
or semi-private spaces.466
While the normative strains of openness and collaboration are significant
parts of what’s described as “internet culture,” there is also a strong emphasis on
independence and community solutions.
5.3.2

A free web
The idea of “internet freedom” has become a particularly contentious issue in

internet governance, making the formation of a larger consensus regarding network
neutrality more difficult. Many of the concepts associated with “Internet freedom” are
described in the influential cyberlibertarian (and former Grateful Dead lyricist) John
Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of Independence of the Independence of Cyberspace” in
which he describes the Web as a new space outside of the industrial, geographical and
political borders of the physical world.467 Barlow acknowledges the many unspoken
social understanding of online culture:
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You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you
create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics,
or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be
obtained by any of your impositions.468
This is an extension of the independent-minded and libertarian strains which
continue to emerge in tech circles, particularly in those suspicious additional
government or corporate involvement in Internet policy.469 An extreme of this
perspective as described by Thierer eschews network neutrality as a communitarian
principle that puts an undue burden on network operators and potentially forestalls the
development of future internet features.470
In the past, “internet freedom” has been used by neutrality proponents to
describe the cause of freedom from content discrimination, as protection form state
intervention and censorship online.471 But in the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling,
neutrality opponents have adopted argued further FCC rules to “regulate the internet”
would endanger “internet freedom.”472
5.3.3

Preserving access and independence: a split in norms
Reconciling these sometimes conflicting beliefs with the history and structure of

the internet offer a difficult challenge. While some believe the web is free, but that
freedom is neither inherent nor permanent. While there may be a legacy of
independence and libertarian views associated with the internet, at its extreme this
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view fails to fully acknowledge the strong role institutions have played in cultivating,
monitoring and constructing the modern network of networks, its standards and
practices.473 As shown in previous chapters, the development and expansion of the
internet, comes not from its independent development, but instead was built with the
aid of governmental, academic and corporate institutions.
The norms of network neutrality seek to strike a balance between these
competing interests: on the one hand, the internet’s success is in part due to its reliance
on wide-scale adoption made possible by the participation of external design and
investment, on the other hand, intervention by those institutions which limits
participation online reduces the value of the network as a whole. Thus, a troubling
paradox reveals the extent to which “open internet” and neutrality are often associated,
but not inherently tied: free internet advocates support an unregulated and
independent internet, yet regulation may be necessary to secure that same
independence. Designer of the World Wide Web system, Tim Berners-Lee has voiced
the need to reconcile these the competing views of internet openness and internet
independence for the sake of preserving access to democracy, knowledge, and free
speech online.474 He argues may be the best way to preserve the norms of neutrality:
Yes, regulation to keep the Internet open is regulation. And mostly, the Internet
thrives on lack of regulation. But some basic values have to be preserved. For
example, the market system depends on the rule that you can't photocopy
money. Democracy depends on freedom of speech. Freedom of connection, with
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any application, to any party, is the fundamental social basis of the Internet, and,
now, the society based on it.475
Without consensus from the wider internet community to preserve these values
through norms, regulatory action may be one of the few options remaining.
5.4

Stakeholders and governance
In part, translating these norms and values into policy has been the goal of

international internet governance groups, however the widely-varying agendas of
participants and unclear goals have proven these groups to be ineffective in articulating
any clear consensus regarding network neutrality. The failure to find common ground
regarding basic standards of access online potentially endangers the larger global
internet system. At worst, failure to find common ground regarding NN may lead
conflicting approaches to internet service of the web and ultimately a “federated
internet.”476 A balkanization of the internet into connected factions would prove a
barrier to the global flows of information that has typified the internet’s growth.477 To
combat the threat of a globally divided web and preserve the positive network effects of
a globally-connected internet user base, many organizations including governments,
international governing bodies and civil society groups continue to seek common
ground for consistent, global internet standards. But despite ongoing nods and
statements supporting openness, access and interest freedom from
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5.4.1

Promise and peril of global internet governance
Through the Internet’s history, its global standards have been created from a

patchwork of interested groups including technology advocates, government regulators
and corporate interests. Non-governmental organizations such as the International
Corporation for the Assigning of Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF) have played a particularly significant role in making technical decisions
such as the process for top-level domain names and key technological upgrades.478
These organizations work to develop governing principles through collaboration of
interested parties and participants.479
While states have traditionally crafted their own media policies, these key NGOs
have taken an active role in events discussing the future of internet governance,
particularly by their participation in multistakeholder events in which national
representatives, NGOs, corporate representatives and members of civil society (like
academics) participate.480 Theoretically, these “stakeholders” would participating in
meetings and discussion panels, working together to find common ground on issues
like standard-setting for protocols, website naming processes, privacy expectations, and
other governance issues such as network neutrality.
The inclusion of civil society groups, like the previously-mentioned NGOs may
indicate an acknowledgement of the public interest in internet governance and be more
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vocal in their support of network neutrality.481 However, many of the most prominent
civil society groups involved in these discussions often have strong ties to US private
sector corporations, and thus may not speak for the larger public interest.482
Some participants in these events have become particularly vocal in supporting
network neutrality during these global talks. The Internet Society (ISOC), one of the
oldest Internet policy NGOs (and co-founded by Cerf,) has taken a strong position in
supporting network neutrality with an emphasis on keeping Internet “open” or
unrestricted.483 In a 2010 interview, ISOC head Jon McNearey emphasized the
organization’s support of NN with an emphasis on its benefits to business innovation –
linking the concepts of Internet “freedom” with its benefits to commerce.484
The most significant events of international governance come from policy
statements created during global conference events. The composition of these events
significantly affects the policies agreed upon, though none have explicitly endorsed
network neutrality and some have taken marked steps toward more content
discrimination rather than less.
For example, the 2003 and 2005 World Summits on Information and Society
(WSIS) resulted in nominal proposals for internet governance, but little change.485 Each
noted the importance of access to information technologies, freedom of expression and
the ITU has attempted to expand its role in policy and standard-setting decisions. At the
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ITU’s World Conference on International Telecommunications private, civil society
groups and NGOs may participate, but only nations are allowed to vote on policy
outcomes. Recently, the ITU made gestures toward taking a more active role in Internet
governance, including recommending potentially non-network neutral policies under
the auspices of greater network management power for participating countries at its
2012 meeting.486 At that event the majority of countries participating in the event voiced
support for great ITU involvement in internet governance and the non-neutral practices
it initially proposed.487 These moves to make the web less neutral were roundly
criticized by the US and others for potentially limiting expression and commerce
online.488
International indecision regarding network neutrality continued at the April 2014
NETmundial event which allowed all multistakeholder groups to participate in the
creation of its policy declarations.489 Prior to the event, the host country of Brazil passed
as sweeping Internet bill of rights including nods to added privacy and neutrality.490
Because of that, along with a more inclusive participation groups, the event appeared
set to outline more specific statements regarding network neutrality internationally.
While the NETmundial concluding statement includes nods to internet openness,
freedom of speech and other norms associated with the web, the document proposes
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universal, opportunity and access, rather than explicit network neutrality.491 Critics say
this milquetoast response is equally due to both the slow, majoritarian multistakeholder
process as well as the powerful corporate voice in these deliberations.492
The extent to which Internet governance will ever truly be a multistakeholder
endeavor remains unknown and the prospects for consensus around network neutrality
appears to be slim. Though As Goldsmith and Wu have noted, the US’s powerful
influence in web protocol decisions and its influence the participants of these debates
should not be understated.493 While no firm neutrality policies have emerged from these
meetings, the proposals emerging from WSIS, WCIT and NETmundial show potentially
diverging trajectories regarding the issue.
International internet governance deliberations holds the promise of setting
standards for an increasingly inclusive and global internet, but the weakness of these
international declarations and the influence of already powerful corporations and
governments remain an enormous barrier to the success of international
multistakeholder events. While thus far these events have made gestures toward the
norms and values of network neutrality like open access to technology, freedom to
connect online, and freedom from targeted discrimination, these statements have
remained incredibly vague.
In the last ten years, global governance events have more openly involved
representatives from non-national groups like corporations, NGOs and civil society
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participants. At the same time, the policies outlined in meetings like the ITU’s WCIT
have become increasingly less sympathetic to the normative concepts underlying
network neutrality. This may be in part because of the composition of voting parties. It
appears that events with increased participation from multistakeholder groups civil
society groups and NGOs (like NETMundial and WSIS) in level of participation
resulted in stronger values linked to the principles of network neutrality, and
investigating this offers many opportunities for future studies. Nonetheless, despite
multiple policy statements from multistakeholder and international events gesturing
toward network neutrality norms, as of this document’s publication none have
explicitly supported network neutrality and there appears to be less community
consensus regarding the basic aspects of internet governance, let alone clear support for
NN.
5.5

Conclusion: Is the public awake?
Today, both entertainment and activism travel across the same networks.

The norms of network neutrality have established to users that both light entertainment
and life-or-death matters can be shared equally and reliably. Users generally expect a
similar level of service whether looking up the humorous online feline Grumpy Cat,
news of civil wars and international conflicts, or organizing a political protest.494 And in
fact, more often the popularity of these networks as sources for news and entertainment
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allow for political speech in places that would otherwise be censored.495 Major shifts in
how the internet is governed and perceived, such the current network neutrality
upheaval or the 2013 NSA online spying revelations, potentially undermine trust
online.496
The internet has been lauded for its ability to recentralize the voice of the public
and recently some users have been mobilized to participate in the rules that govern the
internet itself. In 2012, internet companies and users reacted to a series of bills proposed
to more heavily enforce intellectual property laws online with a massive campaign of
letter-writing, emails and website blackouts.497 These efforts were in part reinforced by
online content companies like Google that could be materially affected by the laws, the
public outcry, however, did not appear to be spurred by web companies alone.498
In the case of NN the amount of public support is less clear. In part, this may be
because of the opacity of the concept’s technical and legal background. A 2014 Pew
report examining the issue noted that network neutrality debate has been sporadically
covered in traditional television and newspaper press.499 The study showed between
January and May 2014, network neutrality was addressed in only 25 of the over 2,800
television news programs directly addressed network neutrality. It also showed that the
lion’s share of neutrality coverage in print appeared in only six newspapers. While the
Pew report noted that interest in Twitter and in Google searches appeared to be much
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more active, the subject continues to occupy a relatively slim niche. A 2010 focus group
study by Quail and Larabie suggests that sporadic and incomplete coverage of the
network neutrality issue may lead to a lack of knowledge regarding the complex history
and implications of the issue for the larger public.500 But there may be reason to believe
interest in network neutrality growing.
5.5.1

Verizon ruling aftermath
In the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling, the gears of public internet governance

activism appear to be moving once again. Spurred by calls from open internet advocacy
groups and wider mainstream coverage of the usually banal subject of
telecommunications policy, there may be signs of a renewed public interest in network
neutrality.501 The FCC’s proposed rule revisions suggesting ISPs be allowed to create
separate, premium-service “fast lanes” sparked a wave of concern that the norms of
network neutrality had been forsaken by the only government agency with power to
preserve them.502 FCC chairman Wheeler later removed the “fast lanes” provision of the
proposal in response the wave of public outcry.503 As the public comment period for the
FCC’s revised rules continued, pro-neutrality activists and organizations have camped
in front of the FCC’s offices,504 protested outside of ongoing FCC hearings,505 and
signed petitions supporting the preservation of network neutral policies.506
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News and entertainment coverage has also raised the profile of the issue. One
notable example, a 14-minute segment on the HBO comedy/news show Last Week
tonight with John Oliver, gained wide attention for its clear, but humorous take on the
issue.507 In the segment, Oliver rails against the FCC’s regulatory process, the powerful
influence of the cable industry, and the lack of broadband competition.508 Oliver argues,
The cable companies have figured out a great truth of America: if you want to do
something evil, put it in something boring. …that’s why advocates should not be
talking about protecting net neutrality, they shouldn’t even use that phrase. They
should call it ‘preventing cable company f--kery.’509
The video prompted a wave of attention and responses from the public. During
this period the site was briefly hacked which temporarily disabled the commission’s
nearly 20-year-old commenting system.510 Despite website delays, the FCC’s public
comment website was flooded with over 45,000 comments in two days following the
segment’s original airing.511 Since its initial posting on June 1, 2014 the video has
received over 4.6 million views on YouTube.512 In the 60-day comment period, the FCC
reportedly received over 1.1 million public comments regarding the commission’s
proposed open internet rules.513 These responses ranged from the profane to the
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insightful, with about half coming from commenters themselves (rather than form
letters.)514 While the outcome of the FCC’s rules revision remain unclear at publication,
the enormous response to the issue may be a sign that the public is tuning in.
5.5.2

If not norms?
Discussing the parameters of network neutrality in terms of economics or

technology is complex – the technicalities and ambiguities of maintaining, enforcing or
removing systematic content neutrality cross many different systems with dramatically
different needs may be nearly impossible. By comparison, norms may appear far more
easily understood, but that has not made them more effective. Just as the protocols,
regulations and market interactions have shaped the norms of neutrality and the
internet – they have the power to erode them. The ideals of openness and independence
are deeply embedded within today’s NN debate. Without a united, informed
community consensus regarding the issue norms lack the power to regulate. Instead,
the principles of non-discrimination and public access to the web may be more securely
preserved by through policy action instead.
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6

CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter includes summaries of the key elements uncovered in
this project and propose a series of policy recommendations based on its findings. It
highlights the key contributions and effects of architecture, markets and norms on
network neutrality regulation on US policy. It acknowledges the challenges of
expanding network neutrality internationally and offers a series of policy
recommendations based on the findings of this project’s comparative case studies.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of this project’s limitations and offers
suggestions for how future projects may expand on its findings.
6.1

An uncertain future
The 2014 Verizon ruling was only the most recent in a series of ongoing

skirmishes over network neutrality in the US. While nominally the debate is between
network operators and regulators, it has implications for how information is owned,
created, and distributed in an interconnected world. The power to distribute,
manipulate and wield information has been incredibly valuable.515 The terms and
conditions upon which this information is moved (or blocked) may have serious
economic, social and political ramifications. This multi-modal examination of network
neutrality was conducted with these considerations in mind.
Information carriage is incredibly important, yet sometimes invisible. As
globally-connected digital communication becomes an increasingly significant part of
daily life and commerce, this is truer than ever. The regulations dictating how
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information travels the web impacts the news we read, the entertainment we enjoy, the
communities we interact with, and the choices we make. Lessig’s four modalities (laws,
architecture, markets, and norms) have provided a way to unpack these regulations by
isolating them while also contextualizing them in relation to each other.516 In the case of
network neutrality, this means examining the ongoing influences of technological
changes, economic conditions, public beliefs, and policies that have shaped how
information moves online.
This project began with the following two research questions:
RQ1: How have laws, norms, architecture, and markets each contributed to the current NN
regulatory framework in the US?
RQ2: How can the policy responses to market, architecture, and normative regulation of NN
in select international case studies inform future network neutrality policy in the US?

In answering them, the previous chapters have offered a series of comparative
case studies examining a wide range of subjects in pursuit of unpacking their
relationship to the current network neutrality conditions. These examinations of how
architecture, markets, norms have affected network neutrality regulation and policy in
the US suggest a fascinating and complex web of rules, habits and customs.
6.2

Failure on multiple levels
In analyzing these modalities in relation to network neutrality, it is glaringly

clear how intertwined they truly are. Architecture, markets, norms, and policy have
played a part in the reinforcement of network neutrality. No single aspect of Internet
regulation has been able to thoroughly protect the principles of equal access and
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content non-discrimination. At some point each principle of network neutrality has
fallen victim to ongoing systematic failures, regulatory short-sightedness and
sometimes deliberate undermining by powerful network owners and operators.
Following the stripping of common carrier obligations from US broadband
carriers in the early 2000s and the institution of a handful small FCC policy measures,
US network neutrality policy has increasingly depended on architecture, markets, and
norms to preserve the principles of content non-discrimination and access. As the
internet becomes increasingly significant to all aspects of life and commerce, the
weakening of network neutrality threatens to mortgage the networks long-term
potential in exchange for short-term gains. This project highlights the fragility of each of
those modalities both in the US and abroad as well as the need for more robust network
neutrality policy. Each of the modalities offers potential for creating a more neutral
web, but as the previous chapters have also shown, each is also susceptible to coercion,
corruption, and division.
6.2.1

Architecture
The architecture of the internet is both complex and steadily evolving. As Lessig

has argued, architecture is a created through its designer’s choices and the web users
know today is as much a result of its initial design protocols as the newest technologies
used to manage it.517 Not surprisingly, the internet of today is far different from its
origins as ARPANET. However some key elements such as its end-to-end design and
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the TCP/IP protocols that have remained a significant part of the internet’s structure.518
But these protocols are not the only ones important to the internet’s structure. While
new protocols have made it possible to transfer data at speeds and quality levels its
creators could not have imagined.
Today’s web is used for far more than basic text and email. Media of all types —
from telephone and video — are all being carried out across the network of networks
and these diverse media sometimes require drastically different technologies to
function. Increasingly sophisticated network management technologies have also made
it possible for network owners to manage this convergence, but they have also
developed the tools to identify, prioritize and potentially slow or block specific types of
content.
Lessig famously declared that “Code is law” – but that law is not fate.
Architecture is often adopted, adapted, modified, or discarded. Some have claimed
high-capacity, high-speed fiber networks and technologies off a potential breakthrough
for creating non-discriminatory networks.519 But in the cases of Australia and New
Zealand, these have so far not been the case. Even though both countries continue to
invest billions of dollars into constructing publically-owned, unbundled infrastructures,
these measures have done very little foster an atmosphere more favorable to network
neutrality. While these new infrastructures may create a more competitive market for
internet service, existing network policies allowing data caps and content throttling
518 	
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remain. However, the persistence of discrimination in Australia and New Zealand
despite increased bandwidth across publically funded networks undercuts the claim by
US network owners that usage charges and limits are necessary to fund network
improvements.
6.2.2

Markets
For some time the network neutrality debate appeared to be a duel between

content providers and networks with users and CSPs uploading and downloading
increasingly large volumes of data and IPSs and network owners seeking more tools for
managing traffic and recouping the costs of network management. But increasingly
these divisions have become further fragmented.
As the largest ISPs and CSPs grow, their influence and power increasingly
distorts both the internet economy and the balance of power regarding network
neutrality. Network providers have long sought the tools to further capitalize on their
powerful position as content gatekeepers and the convergence of content onto the
Internet has only increased their power. The largest content providers – with both
millions (sometimes billions) of users and billions of dollars, have the clout to negotiate
favorable agreements with networks, while smaller content providers have much less
leverage when negotiating agreements like peering and interconnection.
Vertical integration, high-profile mergers, and acquisitions of content producers
by network owners and the expansion of CSPs like Google into the development of
fiber infrastructure allows these corporations to gain further economic advantages with
or without neutrality. These vertical mergers have given the most powerful players in
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the internet markets even more profits and less competition.520 With little support for
blocking these integrations, regulators like the FCC have traded short-term neutrality
agreements in exchange for approving mega-mergers like the one between Comcast
and NBCUniversal. Under the banners of deregulation and free markets, regulators and
legislators have allowed (and sometimes) aided this concentration of media powers.
Proponents have argued network neutrality offers some of the last remaining tools for
checking the power of gatekeeper network operators.
This stands in contrast to the market system used throughout the EU where
markets have played a more central role in the Internet regulation. A conscious
separation of ISPs from network ownership (known as unbundling) has resulted in
more competitive markets for internet service and potentially less incentive for ISPs to
slow or block certain types of content. While some countries like the Netherlands have
been on the vanguard of instituting pro-neutrality regulations, broadband in the EU is
far from perfect.521 Recently threats of content censorship have come not from corporate
actors, but from laws and policies seeking to strike a balance between online
information, privacy, and public norms.522
The broadband markets in the EU and elsewhere are the result of a different
history and different policies than those in the US. Many European systems are partially
the result of formerly state-constructed, centralized broadband and telecommunications
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networks, which are far different than the patchwork of private systems.523 Instead,
much of the US policymaking regarding network neutrality has been debated on
economic grounds, and often centering on its potential to help or harm innovation and
competition.524 This has shaped network neutrality’s meaning and implications for the
culture at large.
6.2.3

Norms
The effect of norms on network neutrality is one of the least traceable aspects

shaping non-discrimination regulation, yet it may potentially be the most important.
Normative regulation relies on the community support for enforcement. Wider support
means stronger normative rules, divided support means less powerful norms. The
strength of the norms underlying network neutrality like non-discrimination and equal
access to public resources have seen mixed support. These norms were first seen in the
ancient laws of common carriage, which protected good, and passengers have been
passed down from carriages and railroads to the communications technologies of today.
But despite their long history, policies reflecting those norms are far from a
given. As was seen with the creation of the FCC’s Cable Internet Order, policy choices
and other norms (like deregulation) may overtake previous norms. However, the
ongoing persistence of the network neutrality debate may be an indication that these
norms have not disappeared, but instead taken a back seat to more powerful policy
influencers.
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The internet has not only been associated with the values of democracy,
community but also independence from oversight. In part, the division between the
meanings and values associated with the “free internet” and “open internet” may have
held back the larger a wider community of internet users from supporting network
neutrality. While politicians and activists have attempted to mobilize the term “open
internet” as a euphemism for NN, the effectiveness of this to translate into wider policy
change appears inconclusive.525
The extent to which these norms can be fashioned into functional and scalable
policy remains up for debate. The issue has received notable attention at several
international multistakeholder meetings, but beyond lip service to “internet openness”
little has been done. Neutrality policies have been enacted in other countries like the
Netherlands (and temporarily enforced in the US) but, to reap the larger network effects
of a global web, protections against discrimination must ultimately extend beyond the
handful of most progressive countries.
Norms depend on wider community support to exist and thus are often flexible
and fleeting. A united public support for neutrality principles may yield greater
attention to these issues and reinforce the value of access and content nondiscrimination. Conversely, the systematic weakening of network neutrality rules not
only gives network gatekeepers greater power in the short-run, it also potentially
weakens the ideals of democracy, communitarianism, and independence associated
with the internet.
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6.3

Many approaches, in the US and abroad
In the US, each of these aspects has affected the network neutrality debate and its

future. In the last decade, FCC policies have both helped and sometimes hurt the cause
of open access and content non-discrimination online. Some decisions like the Cable
Internet Order created significant setbacks for neutrality, while nominally promoting
network expansion. Others like the 2010 Open Internet Order have nominally
supported neutrality, but appear to have largely maintained the status quo from
increasingly powerful network operators. Legal decisions like the 2014 Verizon ruling
have made the FCC’s position of supporting neutrality increasingly difficult.
Each country’s unique history affords them different opportunities and
challenges for developing internet policies in general and neutrality regulations
specifically. While discussions about open Internet policies are happening all over the
world, neutrality policies are instituted unequally. Several European countries,
including the Netherlands, have passed strong neutrality laws.526 Some regions, like the
European Union have crafted market-oriented policies seeking to reduce discrimination
through competition.527 However, many countries have no expectation and no nearterm prospects for content neutrality online.528 Others, like China have instituted highly
institutionalized and powerful political censorship mechanisms into the internet
infrastructure itself.529
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Because of these inequalities, the expectations of network neutrality vary greatly.
Like the US concept of free speech, neutrality has potential benefits but also unforeseen
consequences across cultures. These disagreements have stood in the way of creating a
wider community consensus behind non-discrimination norms making US and
international governance regarding the issue particularly complex and often ineffective.
Today, there is no “one size fits all” network neutrality rule that can work around the
world.
6.4

Policy considerations and recommendations
Some have argued for a balanced approach to broadband network

discrimination that acknowledges the potential abuses by network providers as well as
recognizing acceptable conditions for network management.530 This would require a
large degree of transparency and trust on behalf of all parties involved. The existing
policies of NN have been constructed through an amalgamation of laws, stakeholder
relationships and technological developments. The normative values upon which the
NN debate takes place have been established through the historical emergence of the
issue as well as the cultural and evaluative perspectives of the values associated with
the global information networking.
One side effect of the 2014 Verizon ruling was a legal reinforcement of the FCC’s
jurisdiction to regulate the internet – a power with some open internet advocates have
warned may set a bad precedent for the agency’s ability to interfere with the web in the
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future.531 This balance of neutrality norms means balancing the public’s desire for
robust regulation of powerful network operators, while also reassuring suspicions of
government overreach online.
With this tension in mind, Marsden has argued for a co-regulatory or selfregulatory standard in which stakeholders (ISPs, CSPs, NGOs, and governments) agree
to enforce a normative standard for non-discrimination.532 With the exception of some
abuses, this has largely been the status quo in the US. The FCC’s 2010 Open Internet
Order nominally enforced standards supporting NN with some flexibility for network
QoS, tiered pricing and interconnection negotiations. In the co-regulatory model,
networks would be discouraged from closed or discriminatory behavior for fear of
market reactions and public outcry.
Co-regulation and self-regulation may offer an acceptable approach to
promoting neutrality without onerous regulations, but it may not be effective in all
situations. In the EU where regulations must be applied across many different national
infrastructures and ISP competition is more robust because of unbundling, coregulation may offer a way to establish more general, common-ground principles for
internet governance. However, in the US network owners and ISPs are often the same
and competition is less robust, this option seems more susceptible to manipulation and
inefficiency.
Following Verizon’s successful legal challenge, the FCC’s authority to regulate
internet communication was reaffirmed, but the agency has exhausted nearly all
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options short of reclassification for preserving network neutrality. Some have argued
that content and pricing discrimination may be better challenged on antitrust grounds
by agencies like the Federal Trade Commission or Justice Department, particularly as
network providers increasingly merge and vertically integrate.533 While the FCC has
made broadband network neutrality a stipulation of several large telecommunications
mergers, these stipulations are only temporary a solution to long-term problems.
6.4.1

Political landscape for network neutrality today
Political change is unpredictable. As chapter two showed, the policy history of

network neutrality in the US is marked by unexpected successes, remarkable failures,
incremental developments and rapid shifts in political and social momentum.
Legislation and legal decisions often have significant and unexpected results – the
recent Verizon decision is just the most recent example. With these reservations, the
following policy recommendations attempt to take into consideration the current
political and regulatory environment for internet regulation in the US.
Clear legislative policies supporting network neutrality appear less likely in
the short-term. Though a handful of neutrality-relevant bills (both for and against) have
been suggested following the 2014 Verizon ruling, these appear to be largely political
gestures.534 While US President Barack Obama has expressed support for network
neutrality and other “open internet” policies, the President’s support has not
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translated into robust political action since at least 2010.535 In part, the lack of more
political attention to the issue (from both the legislative and executive branches) may be
due to the telecommunications industry’s sizable lobbying and campaign donations.536
This has raised concerns about regulatory capture and a “revolving door” regarding
telecommunications oversight in general, extending to the FCC. This was particularly
apparent with the appointment of FCC chair Wheeler, a former lobbyist for the telecom
industry.537
6.4.2

Network Neutrality policy proposals
Just as the symptoms span all four modalities, so should the treatments. The

following recommendations are informed by this projects analysis of the US approaches
and regulation of network neutrality, along with comparative examinations of each
chapter’s international case study. They range from minor oversight suggestions such
as improved merger and transparency oversight to instituting a separations principle
that would result in a wholesale restructuring of the US media and broadband industry.
While it is conceivable that all or none of these proposals are translated into law, they
each offer elements that would promote a more net neutral and non-discriminatory
web.
Recommendation 1: Robust transparency enforcement
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Initial transparency and reporting requirements instituted in the 2010 Open
Internet Order should be preserved and potentially expanded. If policymakers were to
require monitoring and reporting of internet speeds from both users and content
providers, it may create an atmosphere of greater transparency regarding internet
distribution. While there are technological factors (such as the testing services which
sometimes report drastically different results,) efforts to monitor and report results offer
one of the few options for keeping ISPs and networks accountable to the public.538
Unfortunately, transparency is vague and hard to assess by regulators. For
instance, despite EU policies calling for greater traffic management transparency, the
2012 EU investigation revealed widespread ISP throttling and other discriminatory
practices.539 Unless regulators ensure transparency requirements are measurable and
consistently enforced, they may not be particularly successful in fostering an
atmosphere of non-discrimination. But transparency should also extend beyond traffic
management to the increasingly significant practice of ISP interconnection agreements
that lie in a NN gray area.
Recently, the public conflict between Netflix and Verizon (and to a lesser extent
Comcast) has revealed many of the more complex negotiations between CSPs, backbone
and last-mile providers. The FCC’s announced investigation into interconnection and
peering agreements is hopefully a first step toward more scrutiny of this increasingly
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vital, but underreported aspect of the internet ecosystem.540 A clearer, more
understanding of these relationships by the public may potentially highlight the need
for more established rules and principles guiding Internet carriage in general.
Transparency has been included in the FCC’s revised 2014 rules proposition and
may be the most likely of any proposed neutrality rules. Strong transparency, if
properly executed and enforced, may offer the public a more informed position
regarding internet architecture, traffic management, and potentially levels the market
negotiations between users, CSPs and ISPs.
Recommendation 2: Heightened merger, acquisition and antitrust scrutiny
Along with the cooperation of other regulatory organizations like the FTC and
Justice Department, increased scrutiny should be placed on the mergers, acquisitions
and competitive ecosystem of telecommunications corporations. While Europeanstyle unbundling or separations policy would be one way to increase competition across
broadband markets that does not appear possible in the US system without a large scale
restructuring of the telecommunications sector in general. Also unlikely in the nearterm, is a wide-scale centralized re-construction and development of broadband
systems, such as has been seen in Australia and New Zealand.
The FCC’s application of network neutrality regulations to merger approvals is a
notable example of applying stricter requirements to these business transactions.
Another possibility is to use the treat of Title II reclassification as a negotiating lever for
exacting greater transparency or competition guarantees from existing network
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operators. The FCC should clarify and update its definition of broadband internet
beyond the current 4 Mbps range.541 Currently, that low definition allows wired
internet providers to list wireless and mobile phone providers as adequate competition
– thus thwarting greater antitrust scrutiny. When wireless providers are not considered
competition to wireline providers – the amount of competition is greatly reduced in
most areas.542
Finally, policymakers should continue to encourage the development of fiber
and high-speed competition to the current Cable/DSL regime and fight legal
restrictions banning the development of municipal fiber.543 The advent of extremely
high-speed networks has the potential to greatly reduce the scarcity threat upon which
most ISPs base content management and pricing discrimination.544 Advocates like
Crawford have argued strongly for the further development of municipal fiber-to-thepremises networks that offer services more in line with the public interest of those
localities while also creating more competition for incumbent providers.545
Recommendation 3: Reclassification in lieu of new internet-specific laws
Because of their sometimes exclusive and often vital role in commercial and daily
life private transportation networks have been held to common carriage standards for

541 	
  Fung,	
  “The	
  FCC	
  May	
  Consider	
  a	
  Stricter	
  Definition	
  of	
  Broadband	
  in	
  the	
  Netflix	
  Age.”	
  
542 	
  Crawford,	
  Captive	
  Audience.	
  

543 	
  Masnick,	
  “Why	
  Does	
  Rep.	
  Marsha	
  Blackburn	
  Want	
  To	
  Block	
  You	
  From	
  Having	
  

Competitive	
  Broadband?”.	
  
544 	
  Isenberg,	
  “The	
  Dawn	
  of	
  the	
  Stupid	
  Network”;	
  Feld,	
  “An	
  Examination	
  of	
  the	
  Economics	
  of	
  
Whitacre	
  Tiering.”	
  
545 	
  Crawford,	
  Captive	
  Audience,	
  260–265.	
  

162

hundreds of years.546 Today, the classification of broadband Internet service as an
information service rather than a telecommunications service is the result of a political
choice and the lack of an alternative between the two. The past 25 years of FCC internet
policy have been marked by ongoing attempts to reconcile the needs of the modern web
with the rules laid out in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 – a document designed
for a different time and aging technologies.
The initial division of computing versus voice transmission was conceived in the
1970s as an attempt to prevent the AT&T monopoly from exerting too much control
over that emerging field.547 Today, because of its classification as an information service,
a similar threat has emerged – the potential for abuse by gatekeeper networks seeking
to extract rent and market position thanks to their valuable role in the communications
ecosystem. Just as in the 1970s, the classifications of today are not adequate for the
growth of technology and the needs of the larger public.
The 2014 Verizon case struck down aspects of the 2010 Open Internet Order that
were too similar to Title II telecommunications, but did not deny the FCC’s power to
reclassify broadband altogether.548 Many network neutrality supporters have argued
reclassification to Title II is the clearest way forward to preserve the “open internet.”549
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Because of the prior court rulings, Crawford argues reclassification may be one of the
only options left for the FCC use in preventing online content discrimination:
Without the right administrative label applied to these services, every step the
commission takes to address these problems will be subject to a protracted battle over
whether the FCC is impermissibly treating the network providers as ‘common
carriers.’550
This approach would re-apply common carrier obligations to internet service in
the US, however its unclear how the policy’s other restrictions would affect web service.
Some (including the ISPs themselves) have argued common carrier rules would create
onerous burdens on network operators and may be virtually impossible across internet
systems – because of how data is transmitted.551
One option available today would be for the FCC to reclassify internet service
under the existing Title II telecommunications rules in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, but with selective forbearance. This action would restore common carriage
rules to internet service while selectively ignoring Title II’s most onerous
requirements.552 Forbearance offers the benefits of Title II without the need to apply
telephone-specific rules.553 McSherry argues:
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So while we call on the FCC to do the right and sensible thing and reclassify, we
must simultaneously demand that the FCC explicitly reject any
telecommunications regulations beyond specific and narrow prohibitions and
requirements designed to create a fair and level playing field for innovation and
user choice. Without broad forbearance, reclassification can become a nightmare
for users, innovators and service providers alike.554
While FCC reclassification of broadband services is not highly likely in 2014,
such an action would undoubtedly draw legal challenges from the major ISPs and
create a protracted legal battle regarding the application of the 1996
Telecommunications Laws. Until the case was decided this would allow for de-facto
common carriage online until the reclassification was either successfully challenged by
network operators or a new telecommunications law is passed.
Recommendation 4: Incentivize network neutral practices
Policymakers should examine possible avenues for incentivizing network
owners and operators to operate using network neutral practices and minimally
invasive network management tools. Gilroy notes that incentives of this nature have
been recently attempted in the US as recently as in 2009.555 Network neutrality rules
were included as requirements for grant recipients in two separate programs funded
through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.556 Future policy actions
that might build on this practice include offering tax incentives or rebates for network
operators conducting sufficiently net neutral practices. Similar incentives on the state
and local level may also be effective, particularly in high-population areas like New
York and California.
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Recommendation 5: Encourage broadband separation or unbundling
Because of its unique regulatory history, the issue of common carriage and
reclassification has been described as a uniquely “American problem.”557 The ubiquity
of cable television along with telephone lines, both of which can serve as conduits for
broadband traffic were leveraged by ISPs as rationale for shedding previous common
carriage requirements.558 In Europe, this hasn’t been the case because households often
only have access to a single broadband technology line and thus restrictions requiring
unbundling or universal service access have remained.559As a measure to thwart the
increasing reliance on only a few broadband providers, policymakers should consider
forced separation of infrastructure and ISP ownership. While drastic, this separation
would dissuade the conflicts-of-interest that may lead to anti-competitive, non-neutral
treatment.
Similarly, Wu’s “separations principle” would prohibit cross-ownership of CSPs,
network ownership, or ISPs – while also prohibiting government interference or
winner-choosing.560 He argues the preservation of competitive information markets and
the public’s interest in the cultivation of the internet means regulators, led by the FCC,
should play an active role in pursuing these ends.561 Grove and Baumann argue layer
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separation would reduce inefficient investment by both ISPs and CSPs attempting to
enter the other’s business domains.562
Layer separations echoes the 1948 Supreme Court case U.S. v. Paramount Pictures
Inc. in which the largest motion picture corporations (which owned content production,
distribution and exhibition) were ordered to sell their interests in distribution and/or
exhibition on the grounds that this level of ownership violated existing antitrust laws.563
However, some have argued these “separations” approaches all rely on market forces,
which alone may not provide the assurances needed for network neutrality.564 Even the
1948 Paramount decision was thwarted by some studios, and eventually undermined by
future deregulators.
The EU’s network neutrality strategy has largely relied on a lighter version of
this separations principle by encouraging the unbundling of ISPs from network
infrastructure. Because of different infrastructures, business conditions and existing
laws between European countries, these policies are an attempt to encourage
broadband competition while disrupting existing structures as little as possible.
As legacy media technologies continue to migrate to a single Internet Protocol
platform, there may be a renewed call for policies like unbundling. In part, the US’s
abandonment of common carrier regulation in the early 2000s was the availability of
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multi-platform competition between cable and DSL, but if no viable competitor emerges
for increasingly-available FTTP connections, there may be a need to restore common
carrier-like policies.
6.5

Neutrality for the future
There’s an abundance of things to say about network neutrality, and this project has not

claimed to say them all. Instead, it has offered an overview of the regulatory challenges and
failures. The debate about NN is still ongoing. Rather than focusing in-depth on particular
aspects of the issue, which has been thoroughly covered by Marsden, van Schewick, Crowcroft
and others, this project instead has attempted to show the interactions and failures of multiple
dimensions affecting NN. 565
As this examination of network neutrality has underscored, the interactions between
Lessig’s four modalities are complex and deeply linked. Aspects of policy, architecture,
markets, and norms have each played important roles in shaping the regulation of network
neutrality. But as this project has hopefully shown, the role and power of those modalities is
often fluid. Changing norms can lead to market power and the creation of new policies.
Architectural choices cultivate communities to adopt certain norms and dismiss others. Policy
decisions outline architectures that constrain markets, and so on.

6.5.1

Limitations and future projects
There are many opportunities to expand and enhance research from both this project

and about network neutrality in general. For instance, more detailed examinations of each
modality with regards to network neutrality could offer more insights into their role in
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regulating this issue. In his book Code (2006), Lessig explores many of the architectural
conditions and structures of cyberspace, but other examinations of markets, norms and policy
would be beneficial to the scholarship.566 Also, there is a need for additional network neutrality
examinations that cross between the disciplines of law, engineering, media, sociology. Finally,
this project examines and compares only four modalities, but as Lessig notes, there is room for
other modalities of regulation and others could be argued for and analyzed.567
While this project offers case studies that show contrasts between the US approach to
neutrality and approaches elsewhere in the world, there is a need for more case studies
examining how the specific conditions of internet and information governance are addressed
throughout the world. As more countries have adopted network neutrality rules, there is room
for more empirical testing of the effects of these policies including, but not limited to, speed
comparisons, public surveys, etc. Additional comparative research projects may examine the
history or lack of neutrality over time, between invested parties, and the effects of neutrality
policy elsewhere beyond the US and western world.
While network neutrality is a significant issue, it justifiably may receive far less attention
in places where more basic resources are a priority. While network neutrality has been largely a
concern for developed countries with widespread broadband access, its relevance to the digital
divide and global communication access inequality should not be ignored.568 As broadband
access is increasingly available throughout the world, the standards and rules of access and cost
tied to network neutrality may be particularly important. For this reason, future studies of
broadband and internet expansion throughout the world (rich and poor) should include
examining the inclusion or exclusion of neutrality policies and practices.
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6.5.2

An unknown future
Network neutrality is only one of the most recent battles in a much more long-

term negotiation for how information is controlled and distributed. This legacy
stretches as far back as civilization itself with control moving from one group to the
next as culture, technology and needs change.569 The emergence of globally
interconnected digital networks and the increasing convergence of previous media
forms onto one space has brought many economic, social and political changes and the
effect of these changes on society continue to be negotiated. The regulation of network
neutrality offers an insight into one relatively small aspect of the larger internet
ecosystem with potentially big implications for how information is owned, created and
distributed.
The regulation of an issue like network neutrality is not measured by specific
policies, temporary economic relationships, inventive programming or fleeting beliefs,
but by the culmination of these across time. The future of network neutrality remains
unknown, but it is steered not by a single voice, idea, or event, but instead by the
ongoing negotiation between multitudes of invested parties.
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